

Roumen AVRAMOV
Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia

**ANCHIALO, 1906: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
OF AN ETHNIC CLASH***

It is widely accepted that the tensions between different ethnic communities in a nation state are nurtured by (and immersed in) economic rivalries between them. The Balkans are archetypical in this respect, even more so during the first half of the 20th century when shaping of identities within the young States on the peninsula reached its level of utmost intensity. The common conflicts in the region reflected, most of all, the competing goals of the local elites with respect to foreign policy, religious struggles as well as the emergence, disintegration, suppression and manipulation of the ethnic self-awareness. The ethnic fault lines from the initial decades of the century predestined many of the wider features in the development of each of the Balkan countries. They had significant influence over the demographic characteristics and mass migration waves,

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the fiscal and external misbalances, the debt policy (especially the inter-war refugee loans); they shaped key/significant trade flows and paths...

In the post-Liberation Bulgaria, the economic and the ethnic were closely intertwined. The first and most significant example of this was the migration of Turkish people during and immediately after the Russian-Turkish war. Conquering the liberated economic space continued for years and went through phases of at times spontaneous or at times, semi-organised legalisation of the ownership of lands by their new real proprietors. The next considerable 'tectonic' shifts were caused by the inflows of refugees after the Balkan and especially after the First World War. Although they concern the Bulgarian population coming from 'outside', they became occasions for ethnic frictions with the Greek community which stayed in the country and with the Greeks who chose to leave Bulgaria. A subsequent reflection of these already familiar elements (done with different means and in a different context) are the repressions against the Bulgarian Jewish in 1940-1944 as well as the anti-Turkish policies from the second half of the 1980s.

This paper examines the microeconomic aspects of ethnic conflicts. The particular case in focus is the immediate historical context and the outcomes of the unrest in the town of Anchialo (since 1934 Pomorie) in July and August 1906. These events had significant repercussions and unleashed long-term and large-scale processes. As far as their political and economic implications are concerned, they reach far beyond their local significance. What is even more important for the particular standpoint of this paper is that what happened there and then conveys typical characteristics of the intimate economic 'mechanics' of ethnic clashes. It reveals the 'political economy' of competing groups, e.g. the assets and institutions used in the struggle for achieving positions of power and economic domination. The events of 1906 in Anchialo provide also an insight into the market disruptions which conflicts, and in particular outbursts of violence, engender. They reveal the motivation and the driving forces behind mass phenomena such as, for example, emigration of large groups of national minorities (in this case the Greek minority), which in the end resulted in the 'Bulgarisation' of an important geographical area.

Researching such micro-trends is possible only through the lens of archive heritage and local sources. Therefore the data used and the generalisations made here are mainly based on three types of sources. The first one is the archives of various Bulgarian institutions which provide sufficient detail of the events in focus. The second type of data is collected by the Statistical Institute, the Anchialo branches of key economic structures such as the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) and the Bulgarian Agricultural Bank (BAB) as well as local financial institutions. An invaluable source was the complete archive of *Krai* newspaper which was the only printed periodical of the Bulgarian community in Anchialo from 1904 until 1911. Despite its marked partiality and clear positioning in the ethnic opposition, the newspaper reflects in a unique way the pulse, the attitudes and the subtle vibes in the social and economic atmosphere of that time, which are difficult to detect from outside but as proved later, have far-ranging implications.

1. BACKGROUND

1.1. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

Setting Anchialo on fire on 30th July 1906 is an emblematic event and a turning point in the history of the town and of the Greeks living on Bulgarian territories. The event is a part of the long-standing past of the Greek communities on the territory of contemporary Bulgaria and the relations between the two ethnic groups. The broader topics have been studied from numerous perspectives and in the last years exhaustive reviews were published by scholars from the two sides of the border¹. The history of Anchialo in particular is a subject of continuing interest. Considerable amount of data has been accumulated on the historical demographics, livelihood, economy, education and the church life since 15th century². The historical accounts of the destruction of the town and more

¹ Ks. Kotzageorge-Zimare, *Hoi Hellenes tes Voulgarias, Ena historiko thema tou periferiakiou hellenismou*, Thessalonike, 1999; Ц. Щерионов, *Гърците по българските земи през XVIII-XIX век (до 1878). Историко-демографска характеристика*, Фабер, 2008.

² A non-exhaustive list would include (in addition to the two references in the previous footnote): Н. Тодоров, “Из демографията на град Анхиало (Поморие) (втората половина на XIX в.)”, *Известия на Българското историческо дружество*, XXV, 1967; Е.

generally, of the anti-Greek movement of the beginning of the 20th century are, however, markedly asymmetric. One can understand why for the Greek side this is a painful and widely commented topic which has been present in every single geographical description of Anchialo³ while its presence in the writings of Bulgarian authors is rather more sporadic⁴. A clearly balanced view on the strained relations between the Bulgarian and the Greek States with, respectively, the Greek and Bulgarian minorities of the first half of the 20th century has been recently offered by Dragostinova⁵.

Грозданова, С. Андреев, *Соларството по Българското Черноморие през XV-XIX век*, Sofia, 1982; Е. Грозданова, *Българската народност през XVII в. Демографско изследване*, София, 1989; В. Тонев, *Българското Черноморие през Възраждането*, София, 1995. Amongst the Greek studies of the town in particular I could mention A. N. Diamandopoulos, "He Aghialos", *Arheion tou Thrakikou Laografikou kai Glossikou Thesavrou*, tomos XIX, En Athenais, 1954, 1-145, and Th. Mavromatis, "He astike kai agrotike zoe tes koinonias Aghialou", *Arheion tou Thrakikou Laografikou kai Glossikou Thesavrou*, tomos XXIII, En Athenais, 1958.

³ See, for example, from a time period very near the events *Circulaire adressée par le Patriarche Oecuménique aux Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople*, 14 août 1906, and a collection of documents by Photios, episkopos Eirinoupoleos, *Episema eggrafa kai historikai semeioseis peri tes voulgarikes politikes kai ton voulgarikon kakourgion pros exontosin tou ellenismou tes Anatolikes Romylias (1878-1914)*, En Athenais, 1919; Anatyposis 2006. See also D. Mavromatis, *He Aghialos mesa apo tis floges*, Atenai, 1930; A. N. Diamandopoulos, "He Aghialos"; S. Sfetas, "Hoi anthellenikoi diogmoi sten Anatolike Romylia kata to etos 1906 sta plaisia tes voulgarikes kratikes politikes", *Valkanika Symmeikta*, Thessalonike, 1993-1994, 5-6; K. Varnalis, *Filologika apomnemonevmata*. 1981, pp. 66-74. Ks. Kotzageorge-Zimare, *Hoi Hellenes tes Voulgarias...* A detailed and nuanced account of the anti-Greek Movement in Bulgaria, with references to some aspects of the Anchialo case, has been recently made by A. Lyberatos in: "Facing the Urban Crowd: Bulgarian Society and the 1906 Anti-Greek Movement", Paper presented at the International Colloquium *Rival Pursuits, Common Experiences: Social Transformation and Mass Mobilization in the Balkan & Eastern Mediterranean Cities (1900-1923)*, Institute for Mediterranean Studies/FORTH & Dept. of History and Archeology, University of Crete Rethymno (Crete), 22-24 October 2009.

⁴ See Н. Проданов, "Антигръцкото движение във Варна през 1906 г., основни фактологически аспекти", *Черно море между Изтока и Запада*, VII Понтийски четения, Варна, 10-11 май 2002, Варна, 2003, 191-200, on the anti-Greek unrest in Varna; М. Христева, "Антигръцкото движение в Асеновград през 1906 г.", *Годишник на Историческия музей в Пловдив*, книга втора, 2003, on the anti-Greek unrest in Stanimaka (Assenovgrad); Y. Konstantinova, "The anti-Greek movement in Bulgaria (1906) in the perception of the Bulgarian political elite. Traditional approaches and new ideological trends", *Etudes balkaniques*, 2009, 4, on the public reaction to the fire in Anchialo. I have commented the interface between the pogrom and the economic life in Anchialo in: Р. Аврамов, *Комуналният капитализъм. Из българското стопанско минало*, II, София, 2007, 562-563.

⁵ T. Dragostinova, "Speaking National: Nationalizing the Greeks in Bulgaria, 1900-1939", *Slavic Review*, 67, 1, Spring 2008; Eadem, "Navigating Nationality in the Emigration of Minorities between Bulgaria and Greece, 1919-1941", *East European Politics and Societies*, 23, 2, Spring 2009.

The purpose of this paper is not to review, describe and/or present a chronological and systematic account of the events. However, the general background is important and I shall therefore remind some characteristic traits of both Anchialo and the events in question.

The defining feature was the predominantly (but never *exclusively*) Greek character of the town population which had been long coexisting with Bulgarian and Turkish communities, varying in size. The Greek element did not have a considerable presence in the hinterland as it was concentrated mostly in a few locations (Mesemvria, Banya). The marked demographic dynamics resulted in layering and mixing of various cohorts in the course of three centuries. Anchialo underwent a number of migration waves which paralleled the clear cycles of development and regression.

Some contemporary Bulgarian studies depict the distant past as idyllic co-existence of Greeks and Bulgarians⁶. Regardless of the actual relations between the two ethnic groups before 1878, later and after the 1885 Re-unification of Bulgaria in particular, the pre-conditions for conflicts increased. At that stage they were no longer two rival minorities within the boundaries of the Ottoman Empire, but their relation was one between a minority (the Greeks) and a dominating ethnicity in 'its own' nation-state which was still winning its recognition. In this context, the existence of dioceses under the Patriarch, or the application of pt. 10 of the Law on Education⁷ inevitably became points of tension in the regions with considerable multiethnic presence. The usual economic antagonisms between the urban and the rural population, too, were bound to assume an ethnic dimension. Finally, the clash between the foreign policy goals of Bulgaria and Greece on the territory of Macedonia on the matter of the 'Ottoman heritage' exacerbated mutual intolerance.

Hence, the outburst in 1906 (in the country as a whole as well as in Anchialo) was not a single incident but rather the culmination of a process. This is particularly evident in the interpretations of the events by the two ethnic groups. They present two parallel canonical and mythologised

⁶ В. Тонев, *Българското Черноморие през Възраждането*, 227; Щ. Щернонов, *Гърците по българските земи...*, с. 296.

⁷ It stipulated that the tuition in the primary school should be only in Bulgarian language.

accounts of the developments of and responsibilities for 30th July 1906. These accounts were subsequently been repeated again and again without significant modifications. They blamed either the distant past (the Bulgarian version) or the post-liberation period (the Greek version), with the 'guilty' party being consistently 'the other'. In the perception of the society the version invariably attributed martyrs' role to their own ethnic group and turned it into a heroic one while attributing the opposite role to the neighbours. The incompatible polarity of the interpretations can be detected in the very language used by the two. In the Bulgarian story (which of course cannot ignore the Greek victims and the damages suffered by the Greek minority) mild and insipid vocabulary prevails. In it the gradation is from an 'event' (even if called a 'misfortunate' one), an 'incident', a 'misfortune', 'lamentable events', 'raving' to the neutral 'catastrophe'. The strongest words, e.g. 'revolt' and 'outrage' are used only when the events are being described as an attack against the Bulgarian community. To the contrary, the Greek narrative does not use any mild nuances and its vocabulary draws on words from the register of 'outrage' and 'terror' to 'terrorist persecutions', without a hint of any shared suffering. Given the distance in time to the present days it is practically impossible to establish the exact sequence and dependencies between the events and thus to come to their single interpretation. Despite some conditionality, however, there are good reasons to accept the term *pogrom* aimed at the Greek population of the town. Even if we accept that this was an armed clash where the victimized side was not entirely defenceless, the balance of forces and the asymmetric material and human damages are an indisputable fact in support of this choice of terminology⁸.

The two stories were constructed very quickly and their conceptually finished versions can already be found in the Patriarch's Memorandum to the Ambassadors of the Great Powers dated 14th August 1906⁹ and

⁸ The etymology of the word *pogrom* is related to the Russian *зрoмить*. It denotes violence and destructions directed towards an ethnic, religious or other minority. In this particular case the term might seem inadequate at first glance since in the town of Anchialo the Greeks constituted the majority of the population. The events of July 30, 1906 however took a different character and violence was exerted against the Greeks by a far exceeding populace of Bulgarians coming from the hinterland and from neighbouring locations.

⁹ *Circulaire adressée par le Patriarche Oecuménique aux Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances à Constantinople*, 14 août 1906. Henceforth quoted as *The Memorandum*.

in the response of the Bulgarian authorities prepared a month later¹⁰. The official versions of the events were taken up in both Bulgaria and Greece to be used in the administrative documents and formal correspondence, in parliamentary debates and in a considerable part of the press. The Memorandum and the 'Counter-memorandum' demonstrate how a completely identical logical architectonics can serve opposite causes and interpretations. Both texts provide a reluctant negative evaluation of the excessive actions of their side. The attempt of each party to formulate a 'civilised' position accepts that the use of force by the opposite side did not justify the atrocities of their own. But this political correctness disappears with the accusation that it was the opponent who started the violence and therefore the own actions were ones of legitimate defence¹¹. Having 'proved' in this way the guilt of the other party, the main aim became to deny any instigation or direct participation of the State authorities in the unrest (in Bulgaria and Macedonia). Both memorandums were unanimous in mourning the lack of support for their people by the Great powers which were deemed to encourage the opponent by their inactions. Such accounts usually ended with a solemn appeal for action on the part of the European countries.

The argumentation of the Bulgarian 'Counter-memorandum' developed certain lines and motives which were formulated earlier, particularly clearly so in an administrative order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions dated 22nd July 1906¹². Immediately before the burning of Anchialo the ruling circles commented on the anti-Greek unrests

¹⁰ *Положението на гърците в България. Отговор на Мемоара на Цариградския патриарх от 14 август 1906 до посланиците на Великите държави в Цариград, София, 1906.* (Henceforth quoted also as *The Counter-memorandum*.)

¹¹ The Bulgarian party often goes back by about ten centuries while the Greek one does not consider it necessary to look into the distant past but is satisfied with mere nonchalant and haughty mentioning of its historical superiority. The Patriarch's Memoire focuses most of all on the violation of the clauses of the Berlin Congress. Surprisingly to the Bulgarian ear, this Treaty was interpreted in a positive light, as a foundation document for the rights of the human and minorities' rights.

¹² *Централен държавен архив (Central State Archive, henceforth quoted as ЦДА)*, fund 334, inventory 1, file 205, 334/1/205 (henceforth the archival sources are indicated in the following sequence: Fund №/ Inventory №/ File №), fol. 1-5 – Bulgarian General Consulate in Thessaloniki, A memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions; see also *ibid.*, fol. 6, 17.07.1906 – A copy of the report of the Governor of the Region of Plovdiv to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions.

with mixed tones: formal regret for what was happening; admitting the surprise (helplessness) of the authorities against the force of the crowd of agitated agent provocateurs; self-satisfaction from the subsequent recovery of the police forces and the persecution of the guilty ones. The explanation of what had happened was said to be in the legitimate ‘rage of people’ on the occasion of the atrocities in Macedonia and the ‘big guilt’ for the unrest in Bulgaria was attributed to the Greek community (‘it was their own fault’). It is worth noting that the Government trivialised and downplayed the events (with the ready-made argument that such things have happened in more civilised countries, too) and tried to reject the economic motives for the animosity between the ethnic communities. An interesting thesis was formulated (and illustrated by the unrest in Plovdiv) that the masses were irrational in the revolt but rational in the choice of their targets. And so the rage reached ‘those who support the Greek cause by their position and wealth’ and was not aimed against the economic interests of politically neutral Greeks. In view of the pogrom in Anchialo which took place a week afterwards, it was ironic to reassure the public that the situation was under control and that the actions of the authorities prevented casualties in such tense environment where even the slightest occasion could have transformed the latent dissatisfaction into a revolt. The message to the international community was the usual racketeering argument of the ‘small ones’: the echo of what had happened in Macedonia was to be interpreted as a warning to Europe; the periphery could turn into a source of ‘infection’ and unrest which the Great Powers would have to alleviate.

Following 30th July, it became clear that the situation has been far from control. It became necessary for the Government to justify its actions along the same lines of not being prepared and having to take ‘decisive measures’ against the guilty ones regardless of their ethnic origin. Sensing the damage on the country’s reputation, the Bulgarian representatives abroad were instructed to carry out counter-propaganda against the Greek diplomatic attacks¹³. With their uplifting tone, the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agencies in the main European capitals attenuated and em-

¹³ *Ibid.*, fol. 21, 11.10.1906 – A report of the Bulgarian Consul in Thessaloniki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (R. Petrov); *ibid.*, fol. 17-18, 2.10.1906 – A report of the Bulgarian Consul in Thessaloniki to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confes-

bellished the reaction of the Western countries, promoted the version of the fault of the Greek minority, exaggerated the Government success in neutralising of the Greek position, stressed on the visits of D. Petkov and R. Petrov in Anchialo and the dismissal of Bulgarian officials in Burgas, demanded an urgent translation into French of the official response to the Patriarch's Memorandum, referred to 'holy national passions'... In actual fact, the diplomatic success was highly doubtful, but this was either acknowledged only in one-to-one conversations¹⁴, or else provoked an outburst of rage by R. Petrov towards the bearer of bad news (the Diplomatic Agent in Vienna) and entailed long explanations as regards the cunning policy of the Austro-Hungarian Empire¹⁵.

As far as the internal policy is concerned, the pogrom in Anchialo provoked a strong, albeit not unanimous reaction. Y. Konstantinova¹⁶ has made a detailed review of the attitudes of the main political parties and newspapers towards it, showing a multi-faceted picture. This is partly due to the socially differentiated viewpoints which were described at the time by Pavel Deliradev¹⁷. Along with the nationalistic rhetoric, there were more nuanced and milder positions. The emphasis depended on some specific tactical considerations and political pretence; desire for distancing from open support for the outburst of vandalism could also be discerned. The review, however, also leaves the impression of apprehension or lack of clarity as well as certain inconsistency in the civic society. The ambiguous distinction between the instigation of the crowd by extremists

sions (R. Petrov); ЦДА, 322/1/161, fol. 6-7, 4.08.1906 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions; ЦДА, 166/1/1010, fol. 122, 17.08.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A letter of the head of the Diplomatic Agency in Vienna to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (R. Petrov).

¹⁴ Grigor Nachovich who had already broken his association with the Government was in a position to write down in his personal notes about his conversation with a British diplomat in Istanbul that the whole English press was against Bulgaria. *Народна библиотека „Св. св. Кирил и Методий“*. *Български исторически архив* (National Library, Bulgarian Historical Archive, henceforth quoted as *НБКМ-БИА*), fund 14, inventory 6, file 4289 (14/6/4289), fol. 1, 25.08.1906, Grigor Nachovich – Notes from a conversation of G. Nachovich with the British Diplomatic Agent in Istanbul Buchanan.

¹⁵ ЦДА, 322/1/161, fol. 13, 30.08.1906 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A confidential report of the Diplomatic Agency in Vienna (Sarafov); 21.09.1906, fol. 15-16 – A letter from the Minister of Foreign Affairs R. Petrov to the Diplomatic Agency in Vienna (Sarafov).

¹⁶ Y. Konstantinova, "The anti-Greek movement in Bulgaria (1906)..."

¹⁷ П. Делирадев, *Антигръцкото движение*, София, 1906.

and a rightful discontent of the people cannot conceal the xenophobic attitudes. The attempts of *Mir* newspaper (which was accused of providing arguments to the Patriarchate against Bulgaria and therefore compelled to change the tone of its publications) demonstrates the limits and the risks associated with conducting an uncompromising critique. An important conclusion drawn in the above-mentioned review is that the lack of involvement of prominent public figures from the elite in the anti-Greek movement was balanced out in the no less symptomatic lack of active dissociation with it. In the end, as it is typical for the whole region, there was no radical and clear-cut condemnation of the ethnic suspicion and intolerance. An exception, which can be said to confirm the rule, were the social democrats, which did this in an orthodox Marxist manner, based on a stratification of the society in accordance with primary class interests (alienation from the anti-Greek movement amongst the workers, peasants and the other minorities). In some way paradoxically, the ideology of the class struggle in this case formed the most tolerant ethnic position and provided a neat, outspoken definition of the true situation – as a ‘barbarian anti-Greek movement’¹⁸.

It is hard to accept that the often-quoted disapproval of Grigor Nachovich (The Bulgarian representative in Istanbul) was a matter of principles. The hand-written notes he left by him which contain records of his conversations rather reflect his political controversies with the Government (which he used to declare freely in contacts with foreign diplomats) and which led to his resignation from the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Istanbul. In this case the disapproval of the anti-Greek movement was just an excuse. It was justified by Nachovich during an audience with the Great Vizier immediately after the burning down of Anchialo with the existential image of the ‘semi-savage’ Balkan peoples which ‘raise the suspicion of the civilised world’¹⁹. Otherwise Nachovich’s position was not far from the extremists’. In a conversation with the Romanian repre-

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 47. A meeting against the anti-Greek movement organized by the socialdemocrats in Varna (with allegedly two women killed by the police) is mentioned in the memoirs of the renowned Greek poet Kostas Varnalis. Varnalis was born in Burgas and was an eyewitness of some of the events. See K. Varnalis, *Filologika apomnemevmata...* p. 69.

¹⁹ *HBKM-BIA*, 14/6/4297, fol. 1-2, 3.08.1906 – Notes from a conversation of G. Nachovich with the Great Vizier.

sentative he shared his disagreement with the ‘tolerance of the Government’ and speculated that ‘Had I been a minister... I would chase the Greek citizens away from Bulgaria... I would close the gates for the Greek goods and ships without waiting for deadlines [as the Romanians do]’²⁰. Nachovich’s notes are valuable also as they provide an account of the impressions which the events in question made on various people. They confirm the active role of the Macedonian emigration (which provoked fear and hostility among many Bulgarian citizens) in organising the unrest through its representatives in the State administration (Nikola Genadiev was one of the suspected of this) or by the methods of terror and blackmailing in the regions with Greek population.

As far as the feelings of guilt are concerned²¹, these were isolated positions of the intelligentsia and not the mass attitude. The few press articles quoted and the shame declared by I. E. Geshov, I. Shishmanov²² or M. Balabanov²³ are rather an expression of the national inferiority complex embedded in the ever-present question of ‘what are they going to say about us outside the country’. The newspapers were concerned about our image in Europe, Geshov justified himself in front of A. Izvol’ski while Shishmanov wrote about ‘shame in front of Gomberg’ (the German Diplomatic Agent in Sofia), and M. Balabanov told Nachovich that he did not want to go back to his position in Athens as he ‘was shamed in front of the Greeks by the anti-Greek savage actions in Bulgaria’... Kiril Popov provided a wider comparative viewpoint on the events but was also mainly concerned with the image of the country abroad. ‘In Romania’, he wrote, ‘the Government used the tools of a constitutional state and by the means of special legislation on the necessary reprisals achieved the result which the ruling ones in Bulgaria failed to do by using a hooligan attack over the Greeks who were *Bulgarian citizens*, by organising the robberies and fires in Anchialo. Rather, the Bulgarian authorities achieved just one result – the disgrace of Bulgaria’²⁴.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 14/6/4252, fol. 1-2, 26.08.1906 – Notes from conversations of G. Nachovich with Alizé and Michou.

²¹ Y. Konstantinova, “The anti-Greek movement in Bulgaria (1906)...”

²² И. Шишманов, *Дневник*, София, 2003, с. 117.

²³ *НБКМ-БИА*, 14/6/4258, fol. 3, 10.10.1906 – Notes from a conversation of G. Nachovich with M. Balabanov.

²⁴ К. Попов, “Поглед върху икономическото развитие на България”, *Списание на Българското икономическо дружество*, 1907, 4-5, с. 233.

In purely political terms, the unconvincing way in which the Government reacted to the crisis without a doubt played a role for the change of the Prime Minister R. Petrov by Dimitar Petkov on 23rd October 1906²⁵. An important detail, however, was that the attention of the society towards the ‘Greek problem’ was to a considerable extent overshadowed by the widely discussed ‘Jean-Charles affair’ of March which involved R. Petrov and Michail Savov and which turned into one of the biggest corruption scandals of its time²⁶. This scandal was also commented in Anchialo newspaper *Krai* which discussed it in great detail only a week before the pogrom, when the tension already increased in other towns. In any case, responding to the speech from the Throne at the beginning of November, D. Petkov considered it necessary to justify himself by saying that he was ‘a peasant’ and there was nothing Greek in his ancestry (as was the rumour at the time), that the preceding Government did not instigate the revolts, that it had no intention at all of discriminating amongst Bulgarian citizens and considered the persecution of those with Greek ethnicity a crime²⁷.

This was the wide social and political frame of the economic processes related to the anti-Greek movement and the pogrom in Anchialo. They resulted in long-lasting changes in the status and the demographics of Greek minority and became a starting point for the long-term trend of its reduction and assimilation.

1.2. POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANCHIALO

The economic profile of the town shows a relatively wealthy population with commercial and agricultural traditions²⁸. Vineyards growing, wine production, wheat production and flourmills were the cornerstones of the turnover of the agricultural sector. Sailing and fishing complement the economic structure. The agricultural specialisation of Anchialo (e.g.

²⁵ И. Шишманов, *Дневник*, 116-117.

²⁶ See Доклад на Изпитателната комисия по управлението на страната през периода от 5 май 1903 до 16 януари 1908 относително делата на някои от бившите през това време министри. До XIV Обикновено народно събрание, София, 1910.

²⁷ Стенографски дневници на XIII Обикновено народно събрание, София, 1906, с. 284.

²⁸ See A. N. Diamandopoulos, “He Aghialos”; Е. Грозданова, С. Андреев, *Соларството по Българското Черноморие...*; В. Тонев, *Българското Черноморие през Възраждането*; Ks. Kotzageorge-Zimare, *Hoï Hellenes tes Voulgarias...*; Щ. Щернонов, *Гърците по българските земи...*

this of the compact Greek community) is clearly visible in the share of the taxes paid by its inhabitants (as relative to the total ones paid in the *county* [*okolia*]): Anchialo contributed by 7.2% to the land taxes, none to the forest taxes and by 62.2% to the vineyards taxes²⁹. What was distinct about this otherwise typical sea town were the salterns. Salt production is an old occupation which had been long developed within the Ottoman Empire. At the beginning of the 20th century there were more than 7.000 salterns. A few areas of salt-works, vineyards/fields were the core productive assets of the local households. At the time of the events, the Greek community had held for long time the key positions in the town's economy.

The *salt economy* pre-defines the first significant power resource in the city. The uniqueness of this production (firstly in the European part of Turkey and then in the Bulgarian Principality) turned Anchialo in a beneficiary of a natural rent which the State invariably regulated and appropriated. The salt was an excisable good making considerable contribution to the budget and was administrated by a heavy bureaucracy.

After 1878 the salt tradesmen formed the most influential class in the town whose income was closely dependent on the tax regime of the salt. The latter had been a subject of a few changes. A state monopoly existed until 1895, in the following 10 years free trade was permitted; the state monopoly was re-introduced only to be removed again in the end of 1908. Under a monopoly regime, the market risk was eliminated and the respective price level was lower. In free regime, the leading tradesmen formed a cartel, negotiating the market prices. The central piece in the system was the 'salt registry', established by the producers in order to organise the deposition of salt in the state warehouses and to issue the respective certificates. In the 1920s these documents became the first original Bulgarian *warrant* i.e. a commercial paper issued on the basis of the goods stored. It was widely accepted and traded, easily transferred, and circulated freely ('on equal footing with the banknotes of the BNB'). It could also be deposited as a security against credits³⁰. In this way the salt warehouses of Anchialo gave birth to a real financial innovation of national significance.

²⁹ *Край*, 82, 30.11.1905.

³⁰ Г. Тошев, "Публичните влагалища и стоковият кредит в странство и в България", *СББАН*, XIX, кл. ист.-филол. и филос.-общ., 1925, с. 108.

G. Toshev's academic and general acclaim of this financial instrument emphasised the importance of the trust towards it in ensuring its success. According to him, the wide use of the salt certificates was due to the lack of abuses, to the 'honesty' of the salt producers, to the homogenous salt quality guaranteed by the State³¹. A more down-to-earth and closer look at this during the years around the pogrom reveals, however, a different reality. Reviewing *Krai* newspaper provides numerous proves that the salt registry became an institution which concentrated the economic (hence the political) power in Anchialo. The local MP for example, was reported to lobby for opening of a second registry (following a State inspection of the first one) to the benefit of one of the groups of producers³². On another occasion it was noted that the 'salt registry is being inspected and dissolved only when necessary, and once the goal is achieved, everything is being forgotten'³³. How advantage was taken of the position can be seen from the case of a group of tradesmen purchasing salt at a profitable price and receiving certificates (with the consent of the salt registry) just before the introduction of the monopoly regime in 1905. 'Such deals are a crime', wrote *Krai*, and 'it is known that the salt registry co-operated' with them³⁴. It is important to note that here the matter concerned misuse of 'insiders' information' as there are reasons to believe that 'the tradesmen knew that the salt will come under state monopoly... I am convinced that the matter involves bribes'³⁵. It is telling that the Mayor in 1905 was also Chairman of the salt registry and that he unwilling to resign from the position even after the end of term. An issue regularly raised was the one of the 'dirty salt': salt mixed with additives such as sand or mud which was deposited in the warehouses but received a certificate of pure salt. Thus the allowed level of scrap was of prime importance and producers continuously insisted on raising its percentage. Although the scale of the salt traders from Anchialo cannot be compared to this of their competitors from Burgas, the former were zealously protecting their perimeter. It was not by chance that one of the most fearful

³¹ *Ibid.*, 108-109.

³² *Kрай*, 15, 7.08.1904.

³³ *Ibid.*, 37, 15.01.1905.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 41, 12.02.1905.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 40, 5.02.1905.

rumours which for a while brought tension in 1905 was that the monopoly over the salt production could be pledged to foreign companies which would have led to a complete loss of control by the local players³⁶. When in 1908 the next change in the purchase regime was under discussion, *Krai* newspaper provided a ‘biting’ comment saying that the aim of the locals was ‘more modest. Their dream is to restore the old salt registry in which many rats from Anchialo are going to be salted [to benefit]’³⁷. The important point in this case is that the representation of the salters’ Guild was entirely in the hands of Greeks. At ‘high level’, discussions in the Parliament and with the Minister of Finance (about the price or the salt excise), the group of delegates who went to Sofia comprised the most influential members of the Greek elite who held both the formal and informal power in Anchialo.

The second essential power lever managed by the Greek community concerns the *ecclesiastical and educational institutions*. As in every ‘communal’ type of society³⁸ the importance of these is related to the possibilities they offer to an inner circle to manage public property/incomes to the benefit of a clientele group. The distinctiveness of the case in question is connected solely to the ethnic specificity of this ‘communality’³⁹. It is difficult to evaluate the exact volume of resources but certain indications point at about 4.000 decars of agricultural land owned by ‘St George’s monastery (in 1914) and at a considerable financial inflow from pilgrims’ donations to the Greek religious community and school. It is mentioned that around 300.000 leva from this money were spent on the building of the Greek Church⁴⁰. In the triangular relationship monastery-church-school funds moved under the supervision of the Greek community which provided many possibilities for ‘leakage’ towards private interests. The Bulgarian community on its part claimed that the pilgrims’ donations had an

³⁶ The registries were cancelled during the short period in which state monopoly was reintroduced. This, however, did not mean that the possibilities of the big salt traders to manipulate the local production disappeared.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 159, 17.11.1908.

³⁸ Р. Аврамов, *Комуналният капитализъм... I-III*.

³⁹ I use the term ‘communality’ as the constellation of conditions and mechanisms which undermine and distort the ‘pure’ market forces. Most of the time they are related to State, collectivist or clan interferences in the functioning of the markets. In all its forms ‘communality’ damages the full-blooded competition in the economy.

⁴⁰ *Край*, 128, 28.10.1906.

entirely Bulgarian origin. This situation was once again reflected and illustrated in *Krai* newspaper where immediately after the sharp conflict around the monastery of May 1905 we read that ‘actually, in Anchialo there are two parties: pro-bishop’s and anti-bishop’s one. The boundary goes along the issue of who should manage the church’s, monastery’s and school’s lands. Had there been no such lands, it is beyond doubt that the parties surrounding them would stop to exist’⁴¹. The clear mentioning of this ‘politicised’ economic asset was complemented by the naming of the other one. ‘There are no other parties in Anchialo except these two and the disputes they have around the salt registries: disputes to which the present law [the one introducing the state monopoly] put an end to’.

Having such clear and simplified structure makes it obvious that the power in town was in the hands of those who controlled the two assets. The rivalries between Bulgarians and Greeks (the latter having historically considerable advantages) inevitably focused the attempts to getting hold of the respective ruling positions. The political game acquired transparent motivations and theatrical traits. The formal political representation was secured through the establishment and dissolving of ad hoc coalitions. It is understandable that in the framework of the ‘Bulgarian’ nation-state the winning strategy of the Greek community would be ‘under no circumstances... to come into opposition’. Its creed was that ‘we have local national interests and we cannot be in opposition’. Greeks were from ‘all and from no party’⁴². This formed an only seemingly divided local political establishment. Actually, the model was family-based, hereditary and clientelist, the authority being associated with the same names such as, for example, Leblebedzhi, Mavromatis or Stavridis. Until 1906 the latter two had two family members as MPs (in 1887, 1890, 1893 and 1894) as well as town mayors. In the local elections, the lists of the national parties were used and the Greek representatives formed separate or joint lists, depending on the circumstances. In the general elections, the weight of the Greek voters lessened but they remained an attractive group to gain the support of which was usually done through all kinds of compromises and agreements. This ‘flirt’ provoked constant discontent among

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 54, 21.05.1905.

⁴² *Ibid.*

the Bulgarian communities. It was explained as a conspiracy, by the hellenophily of Ferdinand, or by personal/family connections of certain politicians. In any case, the mass memory had quickly forgotten that the self-affirmation of the Bulgarian ethnicity itself within the heart of the Ottoman Empire (during the struggle for church independence in particular) benefited from the ethnic diplomacy of the Turkish authorities which, at that moment, was aiming to neutralise the Greek influence.

On the whole, despite the Greek dominance in the town's boundaries and the Bulgarian in the wider region, the existing model up to 1906 did not necessarily presuppose a complete subordination of one of the ethnic groups. To the contrary, the homeostasis based on mutual fear, dependence and suspicion, or feeling of weakness bred motivation for relatively peaceful co-existence, for compromises and conformism, as well as for (formal even if not deeply felt) tolerance. This model functioned well in other Bulgarian-Greek communities too. For example, a similar situation has been observed in Stanimaka (Assenovgrad)⁴³. However, such dynamic equilibriums can be destroyed both through evolutionary changes and/or as a result of outbursts. It is precisely such mixture of events that produced the anti-Greek movement, whose culmination was the pogrom in Anchialo.

1.3. ESCALATION OF THE (ECONOMIC) TENSION

Collecting and systematising the various indicators of the increasing economic tension between the Bulgarian and the Greek communities in the town is an interesting research agenda. In order to fulfil it, one would probably find the more relevant sources in the municipal archives. Here the aim is a more modest one. I shall briefly outline the unambiguous indications found on the pages of the local newspaper *Krai*.

The facts revealed at the parliamentary debate in November 1906 suggested that it had been for quite a while that the economic relations between the ethnic groups were not smooth. N. Genadiev drew on a decade-old case (of 1896) whereby the State intended to give away salt works to poor town citizens. His indignation was motivated not so much from

⁴³ See M. Христева, "Антигръцкото движение..."

the manipulated lists including people who were not entitled (later the correct rights were established), but from the fact that 12 persons among them were both wealthy and *Greek* citizens⁴⁴.

The launching of *Krai* newspaper in May 1904 itself was a symptom of the growing Bulgarian civic activity which, as could be seen from the published materials, was monitoring closely the economic (dis)balance. Ethnic references can be found in the very first issue of the newspaper where the accusations against the brothers Dionisiadi were reported with malign pleasure. They were accused of unlawful acquisition of municipal land done with the assistance of an important person from Burgas. In the same issue the newspaper also reported about the attempts of ‘certain people to capture the management of ‘Saltern’ association and dispose of it’⁴⁵. By contrast, the newspapers’ reaction to the inspection conducted by the Commission for Refugee Support was hostile: the critical conclusions were attributed to slanderous reports (obviously made by Greeks). The demand of the local MP Taburnov to open a second salt registry was ‘explained only with hidden goals and it is our assumption that he will manage to secure such permission ... to the benefit of his associate Kokondis in order to strengthen [his] party’⁴⁶. The newspaper followed closely the nominations on key economic positions in the Greek community. Thus the elections for the Board of Trustees of St. George’s monastery were reported regularly. It was also noted that the Board had sold all movable property and cattle of the monastery ‘to prevent it falling into Bulgarian hands’⁴⁷. It was with malicious joy that the newspaper reported on internal conflicts and chronicled the quarrels among prominent Greeks such as R. Rali and L. Slavi (representative of ‘Dreyfus’ grain house) or Stavridis and S. Leblebedzhi etc., which sometimes ended in fights.

That salt production is dominated by the Greeks has been acknowledged by the Bulgarians as an indisputable fact of life. They did not question the existence of the Guild as a legitimate representative body, but only commented critically ‘from outside’ on its actions and the changes in legislation. The newspaper was, however, much more aggressive in its

⁴⁴ Стенографски дневници на XIII ОНС, 338-339.

⁴⁵ *Край*, 1, 1.05.1904.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 15, 7.08.1904.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 93, 22.02.1906.

support for the further establishment of the Bulgarian presence in the town's economic life. Thus the founding of a shareholding company in Anchialo was pompously advertised as an 'economic Reconquista', an ethnic reclaim of the economic area⁴⁸. In the newspaper announcement the company was referred to as '*Bulgarian Ltd*', it was emphasised that it was founded by 'prominent *Bulgarians*' ('people of wealth with proven honesty and widely respected') and that it deserved 'the full support of every *Bulgarian* [my emphasis]'. An entire editorial was dedicated to the founding of the company (as would have been in the case of a big event with local significance) while the benefits from shareholder-based entrepreneurship were widely promoted. The nationalistic message of this otherwise common economic event was reinforced by the fact that it happened and was publicised after the sharp ethnic clash on the issue of St. George's monastery.

All the above facts indicate the bubbling tension engendered by economic issues. However, this in itself was still not a declaration of war. Overall, the *status quo* was respected, the fire exchange was still not a big battle and the conflicts were only of local significance. It is difficult to estimate how long such way of co-existence would have continued had there not been a catalyst of a different nature. The degradation of the relations was stimulated by the atmosphere of increasing national animosity in the country which can be followed clearly on the pages of *Krai* newspaper.

The beginning did not seem hopeless but the publications in the subsequent issues suggested negative developments. For example, the editors repeatedly wrote on the rumours about dislike for Bishop Vasilios⁴⁹, who was then about to play a key role in the events of 30th July 1906. In May 1904 the newspaper claimed that he wanted to move the Metropolitan office in Burgas and to this aim travelled to Istanbul where he spent months and (according to the newspaper) received indications from the local people that they did not wish to see him back in town. Only as late as

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 53, 14.05.1905.

⁴⁹ Vasilios Georgiadis (1844-1929) was far from being a common person. He was born in Istanbul and received theological education in Athens and Munich. Before he took over the diocese in Anchialo, in 1890 he was a teacher in the Theological school in Chalki and director of the Priests Training School in Istanbul. During 1925-1929 he was Ecumenical Patriarch under the name of Vasilios III. He was known for his difficult and conflictual character. (See *Eleutheroudake Egkyklopaikon Lexikon*, vol. 3, 1928, 11-12.)

October 1905 there was an announcement published about the request of the Patriarch to recall the new bishop and for Vasilios to return, as without him 'the Greek activities were declining. He was influential everywhere and is a personal friend of the Prince'⁵⁰. Beyond these behind-the-scenes intrigues, *Krai* entered into an open polemic with the 'Greek newspapers for propaganda'. For instance, it stated explicitly its negative position regarding the visit to the county of the Greek consul in Burgas who 'has nothing to do in the villages where there are none of his 'subjects''⁵¹. However, the most direct anti-Greek attitude was visible in the wide discussion of the Macedonian issue. The first announcement about Greek *andartis* in Macedonia 'which persecute the Bulgarians and in actual fact apply pressure on the villages not to separate from the Patriarchate' appeared in October 1904⁵². The accompanying comment was that the Bulgarians there would handle the situation easily. But after it became clear that this was not so, the topic started to be discussed more and more. It was present in the numerous news about the 'atrocities' (an epithet invariably used by both sides to describe the events) perpetrated or in inflated patriotic editorials on the Macedonian question.

The initial ideology of the newspaper cannot be defined as nationalistic. At the end of 1904 it published an editorial with a rather moderate tone, which contained abstract thoughts about nationalism. The editors also published a tolerant reader's letter which viewed the nationalistic game as a trade dabbling in politics, and even expressed great concern about the opinion of the Greeks in Bulgaria on the ethnic majority in the country⁵³. The turning point came in the spring of 1905 and was influenced by two events. The external one was the violence in Zagorichene. The editors provided space for publishing a lengthy editorial dedicated to 'the Greeks' where the policy and the Government in Athens were accused to aim at the extermination of the Bulgarian nation and the Greek intellectuals were accused of 'living solely with the idea of statehood'⁵⁴. Even under these circumstances the newspaper continued to appeal for

⁵⁰ *Krai*, 75, 12.10.1905.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 20, 13.09.1904.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 23, 2.10.1904.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 37, 15.01.1905.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 48, 9.04.1905.

abstention and making a distinction between the official Greek position and the position of the loyal Greek minority in Bulgaria. The immediate neighbouring with the other ethnic group was still encouraging compromise. The second, decisive event was the take over of the monastery of St. George⁵⁵ before the day of the celebration of its patron-saint on 23rd April 1905. This event had a wide national resonance and was presented in detail on the pages of *Krai*⁵⁶. The immediate reaction of the newspaper was impressively mild and moderate, and even trying to temperate the nationalistic hysteria sustained by Simeon Radev's *Vecherna Poshta*. Very quickly, however, the tone changed and became aggressive. Particularly frequent reference was made to the locally sensitive issue of 'forceful' and 'cunning' 'Hellenisation' of 'pure Bulgarians' (according to the editors this was the case for more than half of the Greek community⁵⁷). The general excitement made it impossible to keep a neutral position. Moreover, there seemed to have been threats addressed to *Krai* newspaper. Following the 'take over', the ethnic tension in Anchialo became visible and despite the periods of relative tranquillity afterwards, the rhetoric started to include the common nationalistic subjects on regular basis. All this merged with the raising countrywide attitudes against the Greek minority which culminated in the protests in June and July 1906.

The unrest of April and May 1905 were an omen and a bloodless rehearsal (almost identical as far as the mass psychosis on both sides is concerned) of what was about to happen a year later. If we ignore the ideological taint and the details, the sequence of events was above all a blow against the *economic* status quo in the two-ethnic microenvironment. The encroachment over the control of the monastery concerned directly one (*the ecclesiastical one*) of the two economic power vectors which sustained the traditional balance of forces. In 1905 and especially in 1906 (with the aid of the Bulgarian population from the 'hinterland') the political economy of the ethnic equilibrium at the heart of Anchialo was fundamentally shaken.

⁵⁵ It was manifested in the assumed supervision of the monastery by the Permanent Regional Commission of Burgas.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 52, 53.

⁵⁷ Two years later, after the pogrom, the newspaper would claim that the 'mask fell and the truth was revealed': There are no Greeks in Anchialo, Mesemvria, Sozopol, there are *only* Bulgarians who were forced to become Greeks (*Ibid.*, 143, 28.02.1907).

2. THE POGROM

2.1. IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES: SCALE

The events of 30th July 1906 and of the next few days have been recounted many times in two mutually exclusive narratives (the Bulgarian and the Greek one). The Bulgarian version was taken up and further developed by *Krai* newspaper which itself added to the tension by the comments and announcements published there. On 24th June⁵⁸ an appeal *Organise rallies!* was published; on 22nd July⁵⁹ the article *Turbulent days* reported how the anxiety had been transferred from Plovdiv and Burgas to Anchialo; on 29th July⁶⁰ the newspaper discussed a plan of the overexcited Greek community for ‘self-defence’, for arming and ‘killing of all Bulgarian clerks’; and on 9th August (the first issue after the fire, number 116, designed with black frame) we find a detailed hourly chronology of the events, an initial evaluation of what happened (in which the Bulgarians were said to be the victims, the Greeks the aggressor, Vasilios the main instigator) and even an appeal for peace and forgiveness. The conclusion was that the latent hostility which had been accumulated for years came to the surface. The newspaper reminded (to some extent with good reason) that it had warned about the danger. The Greek version was completely symmetrical to the one above as far as the culpability and the martyrology were defined.

A certain (not impartial) idea about responsibilities is given by the list of the indicted for the events. Initially *Krai* mentioned 33 people being arrested (4 of whom released without bail; one on bail and 14 were kept in prison). Amongst those charged were the mayor Stavridis and 6 municipal councillors (all Greeks, including the influential S. Leblebedzhi)⁶¹. The more complete data reported about 122 under investigation of whom 94 Greeks and 28 Bulgarians. 96 were charged with revolt and 26 with robberies⁶².

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 115.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 117, 12.08.1906.

⁶² *LQA*, 166/1/1012, fol. 37, 9.09.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A report from the Region Governor of Burgas to the Ministry of Interior.

Different inventories of the economic consequences could be established. In what follows the effects of the pogrom are arranged according to their time horizon.

Human losses. Immediately after 30th July the most commented and manipulated news was, of course, that of the number of fatalities. In the Memorandum of the Patriarch⁶³, we read about 9 Greeks who were killed in front of the church and 70 more (mainly old people, women and children) who burned alive or were killed in their houses or in the streets. The number of Bulgarian casualties reported was 32. Initially, the news that metropolitan Vasilios, too, died in the fire shocked the public, but it was disproved soon afterwards. Towards mid-August the obviously exaggerated numbers were rendered more precise. Reports, however, were still mixed. *Krai* newspaper indicated 12 killed (of whom 7 Bulgarians and 5 Greeks)⁶⁴, while *Bulagence* information agency informed about 8 casualties of which 2 Bulgarians⁶⁵. The final figures should be those given by the Burgas regional administration, namely, about 14 people killed (of whom 10 Greeks) and 25-30 injured⁶⁶.

Capital. The scale of the damages in Anchialo was impressive. The fire destroyed buildings and movable property in considerable volumes. The first evaluations were soon to follow but the issues concerning aid and compensation of losses were dragging for years afterwards.

As with the number of casualties, days after the violent outburst the report on physical damages were exaggerated (from the Greek party) and undermined (by the Bulgarian one). In the diplomatic struggle that followed, the Greek position was that the town burned down completely (and only the Bulgarian quarter was spared) while the Government claimed that only 50 from all the 1000 houses burned and emphasised the destruction of all official buildings and the school⁶⁷. The Government often

⁶³ The Memorandum, 14.08.1906.

⁶⁴ *Krai*, 117, 12.08.1906.

⁶⁵ *ЦДА*, 322/1/161, fol. 37, 19.08. – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A telegram from Bulagence to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

⁶⁶ *ЦДА*, 166/1/1012, fol. 37, 9.09.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A report from the Region Governor of Burgas to the Ministry of Interior.

⁶⁷ *ЦДА*, 322/1/161, fol. 7, 4.08.1906 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Rome to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions.

stressed the point that the houses that burned down were cheaply made and poor frame-built buildings. Subsequently it was confirmed that from the town structure only the Bulgarian area and 60-70 of the Greek houses were left.

A fortnight after the fire the first valuations of the burned buildings appeared on the pages of *Krai* newspaper⁶⁸. A month later these were confirmed by Burgas regional authorities⁶⁹. A total of 948 buildings burned down: of which 707 Greek houses and 132 shops; 15 Bulgarian houses and 7 shops, 11 Turkish houses. 228 houses remained intact of which 224 Greek and 14 Bulgarian, and 1 church was left for each community. Having in mind that the total number of the buildings in Anchialo municipality [*obshtina*] in 1905 had been 1044⁷⁰ this means that after the violent outburst 91% of the buildings in the town were destroyed. The non-comparability of the absolute numbers is corrected by the assessment of the *relative* intensity of the destruction where *the asymmetric distribution of the damages is obvious*: 77% of the Greek and 52% of the Bulgarian houses were lost in the fire.

If the inventories prepared by the various commissions inevitably leave a doubt about their objectivity, the statistical services defined precisely the scale of the properties destroyed. The censuses from 1900, 1905 and 1910 allow us to compare the number of buildings immediately before the events and a few years after them when the town was far from being rebuilt (see *Table 1* in the *Appendix*).

The shock on the physical capital in all its dimensions is beyond doubt. In 1910 (compared to 1905) the dwellings were around 2/3 less, the buildings with mixed usage around 1/2 less, those with strictly economic purpose were less by more than 50%. The comparison with 1900 data shows that the 'gap' appeared precisely after 1906. Data from the neighbouring municipalities demonstrates that nowhere outside of Anchialo there were such dramatic changes.

⁶⁸ *Край*, 117, 12.08.1906.

⁶⁹ ЦДА, 166/1/1012, fol. 37, 9.09.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A report from the Region Governor of Burgas to the Ministry of Interior.

⁷⁰ Главна дирекция на статистиката (ГДС), *Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1905*, София, 1907, с. 3.

The formal compensation demands prepared by the Greek Diplomatic Agency immediately after the events drew an entirely different picture. The Agency transmitted the applications only of Greek citizens who suffered from the unrests in various towns across Bulgaria. The claims covered the movable and immovable property which burned in the fire. The first lists were prepared in September and were corrected and completed many times afterwards. 147 persons from Anchialo were included in them (with another 18 added after a month). Their demands considerably outgrew the claims made elsewhere and amounted to a 1.600.614 leva, e.g. 68% from the total sum of the claims⁷¹. The range of the individual claims was wide, with the minimum being for 150 and the maximum for 61.570 leva. Amongst the claimants who specified their occupation, the group of agricultural producers prevailed considerably (36 people), then followed the rentiers (12), workers (9), tradesmen (8) etc. The response of the Bulgarian authorities followed two main lines. On one hand, they questioned the citizenship of the claimants and presented the list of the Regional authorities where from 168 Anchialo residents only 60 were registered as being Greek citizens⁷². On the other hand, the authorities commissioned a check of the ‘actual losses’ following which the total sum was decreased from 1.530.000 to 118.000 leva, e.g. it was reduced 13 (!) times⁷³. Certain claims were reduced 60 times and many were altogether cancelled. Subsequently, the indemnity issue was raised a number of times by the Greek side, for example, at the 1919 Paris Peace conference when E. Venizelos sent a letter to the representatives from Anchialo in which he promised that the Treaty with Bulgaria would include the reclamations of the ones who suffered damages in 1906⁷⁴. At the end of the day, however, the settlement of the claims was completely diluted and forgotten⁷⁵.

⁷¹ *ЦДА*, 166/1/1012, fol. 56-63, 8.09.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Ministry of Interior; *ibid.*, fol. 144, 6.10.1906 – A letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Ministry of Interior.

⁷² *Ibid.*, fol. 267-282.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, fol. 243-256.

⁷⁴ *ЦДА*, 159/5/104, fol. 14, 1.10.1922 – Ministry of Finance, Court case of Dimitrios Paskalidis. A rejoinder of D. Paskalidis, 1922, 1931.

⁷⁵ See T. Dragostinova, “Speaking National...”

Economic activity. It is only natural to suppose that the burning down of Anchialo would result in lasting paralysis of the economic life there. Indeed, the micro-level data (see *Table 2* in the *Appendix*) corroborates the negative shock, but the data is not as unambiguous as we might expect.

In 1906 the main area of economic activity, the salt production, reached its low in 15 years. It is certain that a part of this sharp decline is attributable to the chaos after the fire, which took place in the most active months in the salt extraction process: August and September. However, the production level was close to the one of other 'bad' years (such as 1897, 1900) and the recovery was quick. In 1907 the salt production grew four times and in the subsequent two years (in 1909 in particular) it was unusually high. The weather seems to have also contributed to this. The rainfall data show that 1906 was wet (e.g. unfavourable) while 1907 and 1908 were relatively dry (e.g. good for the salt production). The additional indicators demonstrate that the events in Anchialo had no influence whatsoever on the market prices of the salt in Bulgaria. This can probably be explained by the increased import in 1907 (however, still within the usual volume range) which compensated for the reduced supply from Anchialo. The pogrom had no impact on the revenues from salt excise. In 1906 and 1907 the excise collected exceeded both the forecasted sums and the revenues from 1905.

As regards vine growing, there are no continuous times-series, but by 1910 the decline was clear. There are a number of reasons to think that it was not the events in town to blame for this: 1906 and 1907 were very difficult for the vine growing in the whole country. The impact on the commercial turnover is seen from the data for the two neighbouring ports of Anchialo and Mesemvria. In 1904-1905 they underwent considerable upsurge which came into a sharp decline in the subsequent years. The disorder of the economic life and the emigration which followed, led to decrease of the import and export in these ports by a few times.

The rhythm of economic activity is not always captured accurately by output indicators. A more precise picture can be provided by financial data of the credit institutions operating in the region. Up until 1907 the main one was the branch of the BAB, and from 1st November the Bulgar-

ian National Bank (BNB) also opened its branch. The direct interest of the BNB in itself was a sign of economic revival rather than a signal of decline. In any case, the protocols from the meetings of the Managing Board of the BNB from the period August-December 1906 do not reflect any special interest towards the events in Anchialo. The city was mentioned only once, in relation to a current issue. In the minutes of the governing body of the BAB we find a few more indications. Thus, in November it was decided to extend loans to the inhabitants of the town, which had been stopped in accordance with a previous order⁷⁶. At the same time, the branch's decision to stop crediting against salterns was approved⁷⁷. These decisions loosened or tightened the general liquidity in line with the chaotic situation in the region after the pogrom. In no way, however, they focused on one or the other ethnic community and the particular cases from Anchialo discussed by the Managing Board during this period referred solely to Bulgarians. We should also bear in mind that the loans of the BAB and BNB benefited a relatively small part of the population. In 1905 *Krai* newspaper complained that 'here there is no other credit institution but the BAB. Because of the considerable hurdles, privileges and formalities, obtaining credit from is difficult'⁷⁸.

Regardless of the above, peculiarities and the fact that the financial reports of the two banks reflected their activities in the whole *county* (and not just in Anchialo), the data remain a very useful source of information which helps to evaluate the financial impact of the pogrom.

The BNB figures shown in *Table 3* (see *Appendix*) indicate that 1907 and (particularly) 1908 were years of financial squeeze. This, however, cannot be fully attributed to the effect of the pogrom, because the overall state of affairs in Bulgaria in this period was negatively influenced by the world financial crisis of 1907. The activities of the bank in the county were characterised by a collapse in the amount of discounted and deposited bills in 1907 and of the mortgages in 1906 (which were not recovered until 1908). The outstanding bills at the end of the year shrank abruptly, but only in 1906, while the bills turnover was not considerably disrupted:

⁷⁶ *ЦДА*, 288/3/1, fol. 217, 6.11.1906 – Bulgarian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank (BAB). Minutes of the meetings of the Managing board of the BAB.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 227, 18.11.1906.

⁷⁸ *Край*, 54, 21.05.1905.

the debtors seem to have repaid older debts without hesitating to enter (and repay within the year) into short-term financial liabilities. The reduction of the volume of the short-term loans against special current accounts (which were not a big item in the budget) in 1906 and 1907 was noticeable. The total value of the contested bills (which is a main indicator of the difficulties debtors may have faced) was steadily reduced after 1905 but it concerned not more than 6 or 7 cases. At the same time, in 1906-1907 the debtors with bills overdue stopped to replay their liabilities. Summarising the picture through the data of the BNB, we can say that the events in Anchialo seem to have had a certain regional impact on long-term crediting (which is understandable given the ruin of long-term capital) and resulted in a greater caution (in no way halt) in the credit activity of the bank and the behaviour of the debtors. These results can hardly be isolated from the incidence of other business cycle related factors.

The BAB data is richer and directly concerns the economic activity in the town, where the bank had its branch from before the fire. Both the absolute numbers and the ranking of the Anchialo branch amongst the 85 branches of the BAB clearly demonstrate that in 1906 and 1907 the number of operations performed (commissions in particular) was considerably less. The decline, however, did not concern the *total value* of the operations and of the assets in 1906. They decreased only in 1907 which was for sure, at least in part, a remote effect of the world crisis. A more detailed look at the balance sheet shows a certain withdrawal of long-term deposits, which were anyway limited in volume. This trend continued in 1907 and within two years the long-term deposits were reduced by about 40%. Nevertheless, we can hardly talk of a run having in mind the decrease in their number at the end of 1906: from as few as 47 to 33 (38 and 25 depositors respectively). The only drastic fluctuation concerned the net cash position which can possibly be related to a higher number of transactions caused by the disorders. Two parameters of the BAB's activities contrast to those of BNB. In 1906 and 1907 there was a considerable increase in crediting through special current accounts (their amount doubled) and through mortgages. There were no disruptions in the general performance of the branch: profits were only slightly less in 1906, but then they rose considerably in the next year; the interest income was growing steadily.

The BAB data on the fixed assets of the irregular debtors is also revealing as to the impact of the pogrom. The bank managed to get hold of very few pledged buildings. In 1905-1907 it confiscated as few as 6-8 town houses and two yards. In 1906 it was only the number of confiscated agricultural fields that increased significantly. It is more important to note that in 1907 the value of the land in BAB's possession sharply declined, which speaks of a considerable depreciation of the capital and the real estates in this region.

Overall, the financial micro-data do not draw a picture of a (regional) economic catastrophe although it provides sufficient indications of disruptions in the credit which most probably were direct or indirect result from the pogrom. As the lens of the bank statistics does not distinguish between the town and the county, all additional data is useful in clarifying the situation. Such is, for example, the announcements published in *Krai* newspaper concerning the scheduled public auctions of debtors' assets' which 'came into the hands' of the bank (BNB). Such auctions were organised in October 1908 (there were 8 properties included, all belonging to Greeks) and in May 1909 when 11 bank holdings were on offer including 4 empty plots ('*arsi*') on the places of houses destroyed in the fire (two of Greeks and two of Bulgarians). In addition to this, almost in each issue the newspaper used to publish announcements of the Anchialo tax authority about compulsory property sales aimed at repayment of debts to the Treasury. There were also numerous announcements for court-mediated sale of assets (salterns, agricultural lands, plots in the town...) whose proceeds went to the repayment of private loans. All these indicate difficulties in debt servicing resulting from decreased solvency, destroyed property, or emigration of the debtor.

The perception of Anchialo as a ghost town after the pogrom, however, is far from the reality. The significant damages to the physical capital came into contrast with the quick recovery of the economic turnover. The economic and financial life started to recover considerably more quickly than the repair of the material damages and the re-settlement of the ownership structure. Let's remember that in the 'long memory' of Anchialo fires and the following return to the normal state of affairs were familiar events. In this case, the notion of 'normality' was restored as

soon as a couple of months following the pogrom. In October 1906 *Krai* noted that ‘now... almost everything goes in its right order... For more than a week Anchialo has been inundated by wine and grapes tradesmen, and a considerable amount of money is going to go into their pockets...’⁷⁹ The economy does not tolerate vacuum. But after this particular distress it had to be gradually filled up in accordance to different rules and to give birth to a different social reality.

Government budget. Amongst the immediate economic impacts of the pogrom should be mentioned also the budgetary expenses associated with it. Right after 30th July the Government allocated financial resources to enable food provision to the people who were affected and took a decision to rebuild burned down houses at State expense. This political gesture was formalised with voting in Parliament at the beginning of November of extraordinary credits to help Anchialo’s citizens and the Bulgarians in Macedonia. The total amount was 800.000 leva but the larger part (5 000.000) was designated to ‘help to the victims of the Greek ‘andartis’ [rebels] in Macedonia’⁸⁰. The amalgamation of the two issues was a clear curtsy to the public opinion. Only a month later an additional extraordinary credit of 120.000 leva was passed for food and accommodation of the inhabitants of Anchialo⁸¹. These expenses constituted an insignificant burden for the budget (0.16% from the current Government expenditures for 1907)⁸², but the difficulties associated with the utilisation of these funds fed the public interest in Anchialo for years. Their history provides a good illustration of the more general problem of the rationality in spending public money and is a smaller scale replica of the saga ‘from the other side of the border’ concerning the accommodation of the refugees from Anchialo in Greece (see below).

As early as September 1906 the decision of the Government to build shelters for those left without housing after the fire was met with reserves. It was pointed out that most of those people had already found one or another form of housing and the shelters would be completely redundant:

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 125, 7.10.1906.

⁸⁰ Стенографски дневници на XIII ОНС, 1906, с. 470, 474.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, с. 1300.

⁸² ГДС, *Статистически годишник на Царство България, 1910*, София, 1911, с. 428.

no one would go to live there 'as they did not go to live in the tents'⁸³. It was also pointed out that the shelters were unlikely to accommodate more than 10-20 willing families while the projected number of those in need was estimated to be 200. The further developments followed the 'archi-classical' scenario associated with Government aid. The initial plan was to build 50 shelters in the course of two and a half months which would have costed about 6.000 each. This was more than the value of the destroyed buildings which, moreover, were permanent and not temporary housing. It is easy to suppose that the growing discontent was motivated not so much by high moral values but by the envy, that Government money was spent on the Greek community. The discontent continued for years and the ethnic aspect of it became more and more visible. When the shelters were completed, the critique focused on the implementation of the project and the access to them. It was claimed that they were built on unsuitable (marshy) soil and it was unthinkable for anyone to live in. Irritation was expressed also at the fact that the beneficiaries were not only ethnic Greeks but 'well-off' ones. It became known how certificates for need were obtained in 1906. The mechanism was typical for the misuse of any Government aid: the certificates were issued by the municipality on the condition that 'the victim brings two people to testify that he had a chest of drawers which burnt, or a carpet, which means that he has 'suffered'⁸⁴! Six years after the fire the topic was still a relevant one, and it was suggested to make the rent of the lodgers proportionate to their wealth. In 1912 the authorities decided to introduce a fixed rent for the 'poor ones', to turn out the 'rich ones' and (after a tender for the rent) to let other people move into the housing. This only led to the inevitable accusations of political partiality. After the Balkan wars the people living in the shelters definitively became a political clientele. There were around 150 families who occupied such 'temporary' accommodation and they were explicitly threatened with eviction if they did not vote for the Government candidates⁸⁵. The State aid has mutated into the usual political dependence.

⁸³ *Kpai*, 120, 2.09. 1906.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 244, 21.08.1910.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 317, 3.01.1914.

Summarising the relevant data on the immediate impact of the pogrom shows that the blow was felt above all in Anchialo itself, while side effects and aftershocks can be seen in the wider region. These effects were to a large extent mitigated by the Bulgarian segment of the regional economy which was affected only indirectly. In the narrow sense, the fire of 30th July 1906 was not an economic event of national significance. However, it would be misleading to stop with this statement. As a paroxysm of the anti-Greek movement, the unrest unleashed mid-term processes which had considerable impact on the entire Greek minority in Bulgaria. The emigration wave and the ethnic re-structuring of the assets induced by the pogrom were the two main channels along which the economic and the human drive of the Greeks, as well as the gradual freeing of economic territory to the benefit of the ‘majority’, happened after 1906. It was precisely these channels that led to a radical change in the ‘political economy’ of the ethnic co-existence of Greeks and Bulgarians.

2.2. MID-TERM CONSEQUENCES (I): EMIGRATION

The wide sketches of the changes in the ethnic profile of the population after the fire in Anchialo can be seen in the results from the population census of 1900, 1905 and 1910. They are summarised in *Table 4* (see *Appendix*) and reflect most of all the migration of a large number of local citizens from the Greek ethnic community.

The relevant figures demonstrate that before the clash 82% from the town population in 1900 (76% in 1905) were ethnic Greeks⁸⁶. Only about 1/7th of them declared Greek citizenship. This picture is not as clear in the county data where the Muslim population had a considerable weight (from 1/3rd after the Liberation to 1/4th in 1900⁸⁷).

The demographic shock suffered after 1906 was huge; in the course of 5 years, the city’s population decreased almost twice. The migration led to a drastic change in the ethnic composition. As a result, in 1910, the

⁸⁶ Amongst the Bulgarians 167 people in 1905 and 53 in 1910 declared that their mother tongue was Greek.

⁸⁷ The detailed Greek studies of the demographic characteristics of Anchialo (Ks. Kotzageorge-Zimare, *Hoi Hellenes tes Voulgarias...*) are based on the Bulgarian statistical data mainly on the *county* and not the *town (municipality)* of Anchialo.

Greek community represented only 54% of the total population. The share of the Greek citizens also decreased significantly (from 11 to 3%). It is telling that the demographic collapse was clearly concentrated in Anchialo⁸⁸. The absolute numbers of the population in the other two municipalities in the county with important Greek communities (Banya and Mesemvria) practically did not change after 1906. At the same time, the total number of the county population increased, reflecting the undergoing ethnic restructuring of the area.

An essential trend visible after the events was the settlement of ethnic Bulgarians in the municipality, which nurtured the reorganisation of the economic space. The number of people who were 'born in another region (*okrug*) of the Kingdom' grew almost three times and their share increased from 3 to 14%. Gradually, Anchialo lost its character of a location with native citizens who had a long family history related to the town. The number of inhabitants born there decreased from 83 to 54%. Finally, there was no clear educational profile of those leaving: in 1910 the share of the illiterate Greeks in Anchialo was practically the same as in 1905.

All those trends are confirmed indirectly from the voting turnout for 1902 and 1909. The number of those who voted from the town population in Anchialo county decreased, while the voters from the nearby villages increased⁸⁹. The level of participation in the town-based voting sections after 1906 was considerably lower (it fell from 61% in 1902 to 44% in 1909). This happened despite the unchanged number of voters. A considerable part of the politically active Greek population had therefore left the town.

Streams. In the course of a few years following the pogrom, most of the issues of *Krai* newspaper described a town still not rebuilt from the ruins, in a deep economic depression resulting from the emigration of 'almost all' its Greek inhabitants. These impressions reflect the subjective images of the demographic shock after 1906. They do not correspond

⁸⁸ After 1906 Turks also emigrated. Their absolute number in the municipality, however, was insignificant (188 people in 1905 and 77 in 1910).

⁸⁹ ГДС, *Статистика на изборите за народни представители на XII ОНС, 1902*, София, 1904; ГДС, *Статистика на изборите за народни представители на XIV ОНС, 1908*, София, 1910.

however, to the statistical picture and disguise the true scale of the emigrant *stream* whose intensity fluctuates (and which even changes direction) over the years. The data on it is rather more patchy and scattered among various sources.

As regards the first wave of people chased away immediately after the fire, we can find information in a confidential report of the Governor of the region of Burgas from the end of August 1906 (see *Table 5* in the *Appendix*). He established the departure of 177 families in total (around half of which had Bulgarian passports while the rest were classed as foreign citizens, mainly holders of Greek passports) and 68 ‘single persons’. If we consider that in accordance with the census data the average size of a household in Anchialo was 4 people, we can gauge a total of 780 emigrants from the four ‘Greek’ towns with the highest number of them undoubtedly from Anchialo. The official tried to downplay the event with the statements that most of those who left alone had done so for business reasons and not with the ‘aim to escape’, that the departures were done in small groups, that some returned, and that the rumour about 300 people leaving aboard the Greek ship ‘Hios’ was an exaggeration..⁹⁰

Regardless of the details, it is certain that the pogrom gave a strong initial impetus for spontaneous departures from the town. At the beginning of September *Krai* newspaper obviously overstated the reality when writing that ‘*all* [my emphasis] Greeks who were left without houses, moved to Greece’⁹¹. However, it is true that with time the movement became structured, large-scale, and involved the other centres of the Greek community in Bulgaria⁹². Migration to Greece reached yet another peak in 1907 (especially during the summer) and this secondary wave after the pogrom was one of its most significant mid-term consequences.

The flows were registered in systematic and detailed reports by the Governors of the regions. According to this data, in the period June – December 1907, 3.203 Greeks left Burgas region (at least 1.542 of whom without passports) and within nine months in 1908 the emigration contin-

⁹⁰ The poet Kostas Varnalis was among the passengers leaving on board of ‘Hios’. See K. Varnalis, *Filologika apomnemonevmata...* p. 73.

⁹¹ *Krai*, 120, 2.09.1906.

⁹² Emigration intensified also in other parts of Burgas area, especially in Kazulgatch (Elhovo) county.

ued with somehow decreasing rhythm⁹³. Parallel to this data, information on the arrivals was gathered by the Greek authorities. The two estimates differed considerably and the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agent in Athens Dimitar Rizov attempted to arbitrate by producing his own educated guess, deemed to be more objective.

The data collected by the Governors of the regions in Bulgaria give an idea about the origin of the emigration (see *Table 6* in the *Appendix*). If we exclude the areas of Kavakli (current Topolovgrad in Kazalgach/currently Elhovo county) where there were specific circumstances (see below), the by far most significant stream came from Anchialo (1.772 people) and Stanimaka (1.780 people): *the correlation between the strength of the anti-Greek movement and the intensity of the emigration is beyond doubt*. According to the Bulgarian figures, the total number of the emigrants was 10.200 people, almost twice less than the Greek estimate of 20.000 refugees from Bulgaria. The Bulgarian numbers were reduced by D. Rizov on the ground of three assumptions: that the Greek estimates included refugees from Romania, Russia and Turkey who were just passing through the territory of Bulgaria; that a part of the counted in fact never did leave Bulgaria; that there was a secondary emigration flow towards Egypt, America and Turkey⁹⁴. As Rizov was observing from the migrants' final destination, he knew the daily comments and news in Athens at the time, and had immediate impressions from the groups of emigrants arriving there. Thus, the Bulgarian diplomat tended to present a more balanced evaluation, which was closer to the Greek one. His assessment was that around *16.000 refugees had left Bulgaria after the pogrom in Anchialo*. In 1908 the discrepancy in the estimates of the two countries remained. The Bulgarian administration reported the number of Greeks who left (as of 1st of February) to be 14.306 (5.844 with passports and 8.462 without

⁹³ ЦДА, 322/1/199, fol. 11-14, 29.03.1908 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (R. Petrov); *ibid.*, fol. 1-16, 24.12.1908 – A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

⁹⁴ ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 37, 27.06.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov); *ibid.*, fol. 28, 23.07.1907 – A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

documents)⁹⁵ while the Greek Commission on the Refugees (in the end of 1908) reported 26.388 people⁹⁶. Migration figures (including those from Burgas region) continued to be supplied by the Governors of the Regions in 1909 and in the same year *Krai*' reported on a solemn seeing off about a hundred families from the town amongst which there were a few municipal councillors⁹⁷. In any case, it is clear that the pogrom raised a migration wave with national significance and long-term effect⁹⁸. In some regions with large Greek communities, it led to abrupt depopulation which had considerable impact on the local economy.

It is essential to bear in mind that the *migration stream was not just in one direction*. As with all emigrant movements, after a while some people started to return, chiefly due to the difficult conditions (mainly illnesses), inability to adapt to the new environment or disappointment. In 1911 there were widespread rumours about 'mass return migration' from Greece to Bulgaria although in actual fact these were just bigger organised groups of people. The official position of the Bulgarian Government on this issue was neutral and it neither encouraged nor rejected the returning ones. In deciding on particular cases, the authorities disregarded the fact that some people had taken Greek citizenship and treated them as Bulgarian citizens. The only concern for the Bulgarian Government was related to the economic impact. The authorities did not hide their regret that the returning were 'utterly poor' and categorically rejected the idea of the overly zealous Diplomatic Agency in Athens to cover a part of the repatriation costs⁹⁹. The return stream further confirmed the correlation between the sharpness of the ethnic conflict and the emigration predispositions. A re-

⁹⁵ ЦДА, 322/1/199, fol. 14, 29.03.1908 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions R. Petrov.

⁹⁶ ЦДА, 322/1/246, fol. 3, 16.03.1909 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (A. Malinov).

⁹⁷ *Krai*, 203, 31.10.1909.

⁹⁸ The pogrom was not, of course, an isolated event, which can be claimed as the sole reason for the wave of emigration. However, with the scale of its violence and the public reaction it provoked, it unleashed processes which under different circumstances would probably not have become so active. It was not by chance that the Bulgarian authorities accepted for statistical purposes precisely 30 July 1906 as a start date of the Greek migration.

⁹⁹ ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 28, 23.07.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

port of the Agency noted that amongst the returning ones there were ‘very few people from Anchialo, almost none... They have decided firmly not to go back and stay here at any conditions. Many had said ‘better America and Egypt than Bulgaria’¹⁰⁰.

The hesitations and failures, the examples of those who returned, the connections preserved with the families, the relative proximity between the locations of departure and that of settlement created a feeling of reversibility of the streams during the first years. For a while Bulgaria and Greece were two competing gravitational centres and only after the wars the former country finally established itself as dominating destination.

Motivation and mechanics. The migration of Greeks after the pogrom is a border case in which classical motivation (which has been vehicle for the spontaneous emigration waves) is mixed with the mechanism of the *refugee* Diaspora. The stream possesses, in various degrees, the two main attributes of every refugee problem – a compulsory decision for departing, caused by a direct threat or a real experience of violence over a community; an economic shock for the receiving country which has to deal with accommodating and integrating a considerable cohort of ‘uninvited’ newcomers. At the same time, the movement from Bulgaria to Greece had the characteristics of each mass emigration: the motivation for radical improvement of the well-being; the catalyst role of the propaganda; developing of networks between the new and old communities through which the impulses for new emigration were transmitted; transforming the migration into an epidemic movement. What is specific in this case is that neither of the two features was present in its pure form for the entire duration. The ethnic violence undoubtedly gave the initial impetus but its effect was immediately intensified by the economic incentive of the promises for lands. The colonisation motive which was characteristic of the emigration in 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries was present there, but in the specific form of a nationalistic movement of ‘internal colonisation’. In the end of the day, what we observe in this case is a two-step movement: frightening of one community (the refugee mo-

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 55, 29.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

tive) and turning its migration into a mass one mixing ideological and economic elements (the emigration motive). While the ethnic conflict had a powerful presence at the beginning and continued to energise the process throughout, the purely economic motivation was initially discreet and intensified with time. Therefore the emphasis in the interpretation of the reasons for the migration differed in Bulgaria and in Greece. The Bulgarian Government aimed to present it above all as a result of political propaganda and to claim that it was 'economic' in nature; while the Greek one emphasised the ethnic (mainly religious and educational) persecutions of the (Greek) community as well as the 'spiritual stimulus' of Hellenism.

In this case *propaganda* was a combination of nationalistic and economic motivation of potential migrants. After the pogrom in Anchialo, the Greeks in Bulgaria were naturally susceptible to such incentives and Greece put its potential into action immediately. As early as the beginning of September, the consulate in Burgas offered money and free transport¹⁰¹ while in Athens the main burden was taken by a Committee for the Accommodation of the Refugees. The Bulgarian Government quickly declared that it was not going to either encourage or obstruct emigration, but that it was also not indifferent to the 'luring' and putting its citizens of Greek ethnicity at risk by 'fake promises'¹⁰². According to Sofia, the emigration was provoked entirely by 'external' propaganda and the accusations of persecutions and intolerance were made up. The local authorities and the diplomacy presented the whole movement as a politically-driven initiative supported by economic/financial means.

The nationalistic tint of the movement was imprinted mainly by the political elites and the media in Greece. Patriotic rhetoric was used fully in order to achieve certain internal political goals and as a justification for the funds demanded to the Parliament. This language was also gradually taken up by certain refugee organisations. Once on Greek territory, they adopted the local motives, as, for example, the demands for respecting the Treaty of Berlin¹⁰³.

¹⁰¹ *Край*, 120, 20.09.1906.

¹⁰² *ЦДА*, 166/1/1011, fol. 36, 21.12.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A confidential memorandum of the Ministry of Interior to the Governors of the Regions № 4700.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, fol. 96, 21.07.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

The truth is, however, that for the emigrants themselves the two main driving forces were rather more ordinary: the fear after what had happened, and the lure of the promise for aid and land. If the first motive was ethnically coloured and rather specific, the second one was present worldwide in every large-scale migration of that period¹⁰⁴. The initial hopes of orderly accommodation of the refugees, providing them with land and tools, and even offering them possibilities to engage in salt production were spread as early as September and October 1906¹⁰⁵. Information also circulated about release of financial help and loans: the appetite for land possession (and more generally – for capital) was a primary instinct which acted invariably, regardless of the wealth of the particular migrant. The main driving force was not rivalry and competition with the other ethnic group (the Bulgarians), but the *absolute* poverty of the country. The choice was sometimes reduced to a rational assessment of comparative fertility. This is confirmed by the disappointment of Burgas peasants who headed to Greece in the hope of finding better conditions in Thessaly but ‘realised that they would never leave their fertile fields, large pastures, meadows and forests, and decided to return and to tell everyone that it was *unwise of them* [my emphasis] to leave their lands because they would never be able to find better ones’¹⁰⁶.

The shock from the pogrom (and from the anti-Greek movement in general) as well as the economic motivation behind them moulded the very figure of the ‘agitator’. This was a person who played with the economic interest (and most often pursued it himself), he was active in all social circles and everywhere (pubs, churches, schools), he could be a priest or even a municipal clerk¹⁰⁷. In his propaganda he used simple tricks, such as sending by recently arrived emigrants fake letters saying that they have already been accommodated on the land given to them and inviting

¹⁰⁴ See P. Аврамов, “Българската емиграция в Аржентина 1900-1940”, *Исторически преглед*, 1986, 6 [“La Emigracion Bulgara en Argentina 1900-1940”, *Estudios Latino-americanos* (Varsovia), 13, 1990]; O. Вартоломеев, P. Аврамов, Б. Георгиев, *Българите в Аржентина*, София, 1987.

¹⁰⁵ *Край*, 120, 2.09.1906; 126, 14.10.1906.

¹⁰⁶ ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 113, 5.03.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 43, 6.05.1907 – A telegram of Burgas Governor of Region to the Ministry of Interior.

their relatives to follow¹⁰⁸. There were numerous cases of purposefully sent delegations, often including the mayor, sent by the local authorities to look around, choose and even arrange land purchase in Greece. Some even carried recommendation letters from the Greek Consul in Burgas addressed to the authorities in Athens.

However, as a rule, the agitator was a person who had lived through the clashes and who by consequence introduced a 'refugee' aspect in the migration via his own experience. The case of the Anchialo Mayor at the time of the pogrom, Kostaki Stavridis, is particularly characteristic. His movements (as well as the whole emigrant propaganda) were followed closely by the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens. There is no doubt that Stavridis left as a result of the events. He was under investigation and (in May 1907) was still free on bail. According to the Agency's reports he was one of the most active 'agitators' in the town for which activity he used to receive monthly 50 leva by the Greek Government and instructions by the Refugees Commission¹⁰⁹. His preparation and 'escape' to Greece were narrated in the style of spy stories and adventure literature¹¹⁰. A few months later S. Leblebedzhi arrived in Athens. He was said to be 'the most prominent person in Anchialo who had played the utmost important role in the town after that of bishop Vasilios before the fire'¹¹¹. He was also put under investigation (and bailed out later), but had left the country with prosecutor's permission and even stated that it was 'entirely peaceful and safe for the Greeks' in Bulgaria. The above two cases demonstrate very well how the direct participation in the events motivated local leaders to inspire the community and thus contribute to turning migration into a phenomenon of epidemic character.

The 'epidemic' was nurtured not only by setting personal examples and drawing on personal experience. It was aided by the general atmosphere of inter-ethnic tension which facilitated the spread of rumours,

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 113, 5.03.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens... Entirely identical methods were used in order to attract emigrants (including Bulgarians) to Argentina.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 57, 19.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 52, 27.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 49, 7.10.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

conspiracy theories and suspicions of the existence of some secret plans. The Diplomatic Agency in Athens, for example, released information about a project of 'Anchialo committee of agitators' which had developed a new plan for total abandoning of the town after setting on fire the parts of Anchialo left intact from the pogrom and attributing the fact to the Bulgarians and the Bulgarian Government¹¹². Stories about burning down of the native town by the local Greeks before they left for good became an almost mythological and folklore construct. Such rumours appeared for example also amongst the refugees from Stanimaka¹¹³.

All documents suggest that in the process of migration to Greece the typical 'emigration chains' were formed. They facilitated the process while turning it into a mass phenomenon. One form was the well-known family line where the first ones set the path and attracted other migrants to follow. But if in a typical case (for example Argentina) the secondary migration wave was formed usually through the call of family members by the husband who had already settled down, in Greece the 'first posts' were often entire families persecuted for ethnic reasons who 'pulled out' politically active relatives left behind. The declared aim of the Greek authorities was precisely to attract the families of 'prominent' agitators¹¹⁴: families here were a shield and advance-guard while in the colonisation of South America they were a rear-guard flow. For example, the son of the mayor Stavridis took active part in the events, he 'escaped' immediately afterwards and contributed to the organising of the refugees in Greece, to the propaganda in Bulgaria and in putting pressure in order to arrange his father's emigration. When the Mayor himself migrated, he was met with great honours in Athens. While travelling through Istanbul he met the Patriarch and received 50.000 drachmas from the Greek Diaspora's 'People's fund' for 'the outstanding services rendered'¹¹⁵. A different type of chain was organised by a wealthy peasant from Stanimaka who returned to Bulgaria with the obligation to the Refugee Commission to bring

¹¹² *Ibid.*, fol. 54, 29.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, fol. 68, 27.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 56, 30.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹¹⁵ *Ibid.*

another 150 families using his own funds¹¹⁶. Finally, (similarly to what we see in the ‘American’ migration) there were also developed networks for ‘logistical support’ to the emigrants. Such function was performed by the Greek community in Edirne where the Greek Consul, the Metropolitan and a Greek banker joined in the process of enabling the transit of Greek migrants from Bulgaria. The funds were collected amongst the affluent Greeks in town and from the Guilds’ funds controlled again by the Greeks. This organisation was not at all dissimilar to the one known well from the Bulgarian ‘national initiatives’ in which the wealthier and the ‘higher classes’ were also ‘taxed’ with ‘patriotic’ purpose¹¹⁷.

The effect of the purely economic motives for the migration to Greece undoubtedly intensified with time. This trend turned out to suit the Bulgarian authorities which attempted in every way not only to politicise it but also to present the reasons for it as ‘economic’, trying thus to erase the responsibility for the ethnic violence. During the second migration peak in May-July 1907 the official account was reduced to a simplistic scheme of ‘emigration of the poor’, encouraged by some ill-intentioned external forces. A press release of the Foreign Ministry stated that it would be a big mistake ‘to think that [the reasons] should be sought in some measure the Bulgarian Government has taken against the Greeks. The true reasons are: the agitation activity of some agents assigned with the special mission of preparing the Greeks’ emigration; the economic situation of the migrants who had lived in *centres of decline such as Anchialo* [my emphasis], where they would hardly find any means to support themselves; the promises of the Greek Government and the Committee to help them settle in the Kingdom by giving them land and financial support; the deeply embedded fanaticism of the local Greeks etc. Even half of these reasons would be sufficient to stimulate a large-scale emigration’¹¹⁸. Here the mainstream emigration theory is implicitly adopted: according to it the emigration potential is the greatest (and the population most susceptible

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 68, 27.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 64, 7.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 149, 28.05.1907 – A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens. On the ‘decline’ of Anchialo see also *ibid.*, fol. 55, 29.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

to it) in the relatively poor areas. The view was defended with the suggestion that ‘the well-off Greeks never left their homes’¹¹⁹.

This hypothesis, however, is not supported by the numerous pieces of evidence scattered through the archives which show that it was not only the poor ones who left. It is also refuted by the cases of exceptionally wealthy persons as, for example, the banker S. Bebis from Russe (he was one of the founders of the important Bulgarian Commercial Bank) as well as the cohort of the above mentioned prominent citizens from Anchialo who were all affluent people. The Greek Financial Minister himself declared with some enthusiasm in October 1907 that ‘now the refugees coming from Bulgaria are not as before poverty-stricken, but people who carry wealth with themselves. They purchase land to settle on and fields to work in with their own money. For example, the refugees from a village near Anchialo who bought land... for 900 000 drachmas’¹²⁰. In general, enlisting pre-1906 Anchialo (which was relatively flourishing) in the category of the ‘centres in decline’ (as the Bulgarian Government did) was misleading and manipulative. The observations of the effects from the clash only confirm the empirical results of other studies that the magnet for emigrating was the goal of a *radical* increase of wealth, the idea that the new place provided opportunities which (even for the affluent ones) were not available in the old location; and that it was not necessary that the emigrants were the most economically disadvantaged people from the country’s most backwards areas¹²¹.

In actual fact, the economic motives included a whole range of incentives. Amongst them the ‘escape from debts’, mentioned in a number of documents, was a particularly interesting one in the case of the Greek emigration of 1906. A reason to pay attention to this was the incident at the Turkish border in the beginning of May 1907 which involved refugees from Kavakli (Topolovgrad) 8 of whom died. An on-the-spot investigation conducted by the Governor of the region in Burgas showed that this was a case of a mass escape of people without passports which provoked

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, fol. 32, 23.07.1907 – A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions...

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 17, 8.10.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹²¹ See P. Аврамов, “Българската емиграция в Аржентина...”

the border guards to shoot¹²². There is no doubt that the incident which attracted wide public attention was one of the factors which intensified the migration of the mid-1907. Amongst other things, it was pointed out in the [investigation] report that ‘around 3/4 of the refugees were poor people, most of whom gardeners, some of them could return but others had debts bigger than the value of their assets. It is worth mentioning that a considerable part of the debts were to local Greeks and usurers’. Precisely debts were the reason for the *illegal* escape. ‘A large part of the Greeks who migrate have liabilities to the State, but they are also debtors to the BAB and as a result of this they do not intend to have regular passports issued for international travel¹²³, but they leave the country secretly through the Turkish border¹²⁴. It seems that the role of debts was widely accepted as a reason in the case of the migration from Anchialo in particular. The banker Bebis claimed that the lands of its citizens ‘as far as I know are almost all mortgaged at the Agricultural bank and now, quite naturally, their owners lose nothing by leaving them’¹²⁵. The Diplomatic Agency in Athens also noted that ‘there is another circumstance which concerns the mass of Anchialo people, about which I learn from refugees who know. It is that the vast majority of the houses in Anchialo that burned down and the ones which were not affected were mortgaged or pledged as collateral at the BAB. This circumstance is an important one and it is worth to investigate it carefully so that, if confirmed, it can be an interesting explanation of the unwillingness of Anchialo refugees to return to their hometown’¹²⁶. The Agency sensed above all the potential for counter-propaganda based on this fact, which was convenient as an argument because it downplayed the ethnic aspect of the accusations. The diplomat

¹²² ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 43-44, 6.05.1907 – A telegram of Burgas Governor of Region...

¹²³ Issuing of passports was done only after a presentation of a certificate for not having any outstanding debts to the state and to the BAB. (ЦДА, 166/1/1011, fol. 112, 8.10.1907 – Remarques sur les griefs formulés dans une note verbale du Patriarcat Oeucuménique adressée le 6/19 juillet 1907 à l’Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne à Constantinople).

¹²⁴ ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 45, 2.06.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 85, 9.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, fol. 55, 29.05.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

appealed for a serious investigation to be made 'by proper financial and banking institutions at home' in order to establish what the possible *economic* reasons could be and approximately, to what extent they could have influenced the migration of the Greeks.

The available reports of the BNB and BAB branches allow us to make a more objective evaluation of the situation which definitely casts a doubt on the above line of interpretation. The data demonstrate that, although an attractive one, the 'escape from debt' reason was most probably an exaggerated one (at least in the case of Anchialo). The number of the mortgages was rather limited (48 by BNB and 37 by BAB in 1905 and respectively 41 and 20 in 1906). They did neither amount to considerable sums nor had a heavy weight in the assets of the two banks¹²⁷. Of course, it is possible that the property was pledged as a collateral against other loans from the same banks but the high level of indebtedness to money-lenders mentioned before, the weak penetration of the 'organised' banking and the above-mentioned complaints about credits being slow and difficult to obtain by the two State credit institutions show that even if the motive in question did matter in Anchialo region, it was most probably not decisive for the epidemic growth of the migration.

So, the specifics of the emigration to Greece after the pogrom was the ethnic background against which the usual economic reasons were at work. This configuration introduced elements of irrationality and created certain instability but it also facilitated to a large extent the turning of the process into a mass one. It is difficult to gauge the two forces against each other. What is easy to capture is the biased attitude of one and the other side.

The receiving country. The effect on the adopting country presents an issue in its own right which should be studied separately. Here I will briefly touch upon it as an essential element in the inventory of the consequences of the pogrom. In the end of the day, a migration wave of similar scale restructured the demographic and economic equilibrium in the region and thus changed the economic conditions in each of the countries involved.

¹²⁷ BNB Annual reports; BAB Reports.

The reports of the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens followed with interest the local reactions. As a whole, the effects on the Greek economy were typical for a State which did not have the advantages of a 'frontier country' (as the two Americas did) but despite this acted as it was one. The increase in the Government debt under these conditions was inevitable. The first impact fell on the budget, because the authorities had to provide for the immediate needs and to make available the lands they had promised. The legislative initiatives were late to follow (they were implemented only in April 1907) and they were adopted only after pressures by the discontented refugees. A domestic loan ('Agricultural Thessaly loan') was arranged with a Greek bank syndicate¹²⁸ (65% from the National Bank of Greece) for the amount of 10million drachmas. 'Thessaly agricultural fund' was established in order to purchase land for the refugees, to give them finances and to refinance the advance provided to the State by the National Bank for the purchase of a large private farm in 1901. The new loan had a 30 years maturity (from 1st March 1908), 5% interest rate and two annual coupons, guaranteed with the surplus from the revenues allocated to the International Commission of Control over the Government Debt of Greece¹²⁹. With monthly expenses for the refugees of 220 000 drachmas and an inflow exceeding by far the estimates, only a few months later a new loan of 2 million drachmas was sought¹³⁰. This time, however, the banks refused to give it as the refugee problem had significant macroeconomic consequences and ruined the anyway low state's credit. It became necessary for various (unsuccessful) measures to be taken for cutting down the expenses. For example, deadlines for the aid applications were introduced (and not kept); explicit and implicit restrictions were introduced (and immediately ways were found to avoid them); the decision to give land only to agricultural producers led to all refugees enlisting themselves as such; the fragmenting of the sums of money given (for fear the loans can be 'exported' back to Bulgaria) caused a mass discon-

¹²⁸ After the First World War both in Greece and in Bulgaria the refugees' settlement expenses were covered to a large extent by *foreign* loans.

¹²⁹ *ЦДА*, 322/1/169, fol. 110-111, 9.04.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (A. Toshev) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 22, 14.07.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

tent. The Government thus fell into its own propaganda trap and the hint that it might close the country for emigrants from Bulgaria provoked sharp negative reactions in the press.

The State dedicated many efforts to organise the settlement in Thessaly (which had shortly before that suffered a serious earthquake). It was argued that this region needed workforce; that working the lands would result in decrease of the import of wheat, that the refugees themselves brought wealth. Actually, the newcomers were housed in more than 40 towns, mainly in Thessaly¹³¹. The colonisation policy was also related to the fact that Greece itself faced a mass emigration (from Thessaly in particular) towards America. The refugees from Bulgaria were supposed to ‘compensate’ for it, but a part of them was also drawn into the powerful flow towards the USA.

A quite characteristic feature was the clear favouritism for the emigrants from Anchialo who, with their background, served best the nationalistic cause. They were given preferential treatment, longer settlement deadlines, and easier access to credits. It was not by chance that the biggest urbanisation project designed for the refugees from Bulgaria was the allocation of a greenfield site for four new towns amongst which the most emblematic was Nea Anchialo. The foundation stone was laid in the beginning of October 1907 and the occasion was celebrated as a pompous patriotic event (described in detail by the Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency) where the political establishment repeated the already established version about the martyrdom of the town put on fire (compared to Misolongi) in the name of the ‘Megali idea’¹³².

The integration of emigrants from Bulgaria faced all social and cultural problems pertinent to any encounter between an ‘outside’ and a local community. The common difficulties appeared resulting from a political *idée-fixe* which outreaches the financial possibilities of the State. The comments on the part of the Bulgarian diplomacy were sarcastic. They stressed the ‘theatrical’ and even ‘comical’ character of the propaganda

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, 322/1/246, fol. 3, 16.03.1909 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹³² *Ibid.*, 322/1/169, fol. 59-63, 1.10.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

surrounding the refugees, used as a ‘powerful weapon against the Principality’¹³³. The issue was indeed a burning one for the Greek public opinion and politicians at all levels (from the King to the ministers and mayors) were making full use of the topic. Public speeches as well as ritual stagings of events were organised, as for example, on the occasion of the service to commemorate the anniversary of the clash in Anchialo¹³⁴.

As usually in such cases, the initial jingoistic emotion faded away with the beginning of the real economic difficulties. Hostile attitudes towards the emigrants (although attenuated in the elated moods) began to grow as the strain on the local labour market and on the State finance became visible. The Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens commented sarcastically that ‘it is not sufficient to simply have blue skies and ancient glory, but above all, one has to satisfy the needs of the stomach which cares neither about classical poetry nor about aesthetics’¹³⁵. The economic problems around the settling of the refugees were indeed great, as in all similar cases. Such were, for example, the meagre provision from the budget, the growth of mass unemployment among them, the growing insecurity and particularly the poor sanitary condition which caused high death rate. With the start of the big projects for building of new towns, the usual discontent rose against deadlines not being kept and low quality materials being used. The inevitable corruption issues emerged, with widespread accusations of thefts, bribes and fixed tenders. All these problems were quick to find their resonance in Bulgaria and *Krai* newspaper regularly published information about the complaints.

A few years after the pogrom a part of the refugees continued to feel undesirable in neither country. They had heard the ‘have a good trip’ on leaving Bulgaria but now they were beginning to hear it in Greece too, whenever they complained about the conditions and mentioned the possibility of returning. The Greek society was still torn on the issue of emigrants. Their complaints were met with irritation, as signs of ungratefulness for the considerable financial sacrifices made. At the same time, the

¹³³ *Ibid.*, fol. 82, 9.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 88, 4.08.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 82, 9.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

questions of how and how efficiently the Government had spent the 40 million drachmas continued to capture the public interest¹³⁶. These contradictory attitudes were not surprising. However, the long-term outcome was, generally, a success. A symbolic epilogue of the story is that nowadays Nea Anchialo numbers exactly as many citizens (5514) as once lived in the town of Anchialo in the year of the pogrom (5527)...

2.3. MID-TERM CONSEQUENCES (II): PRICES AND RE-DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS

As with interconnected vessels, in every two-ethnic community the mass emigration of one of the groups frees economic space for the other. Its, to a bigger or a lesser extent unsystematic filling up, occurs via different channels. At a *micro*-level it necessary goes through distortions of the market prices and through the direct re-distribution of the assets. The concomitant and gradual changes in the political economy of the local community shaped a new configuration of the power structures and changed the previous ethnic *status quo*¹³⁷. The consequences from the fire in Anchialo illustrate particularly well these processes.

Buyers' market. The 'microeconomy of the clash' can succinctly be summarised as a formation of 'buyer's market'. The migration of a large number of citizens, the physical destruction and the depreciation of capital create conditions for oversupply, for emergency sales of assets and for a general decline of their prices.

The chaos and the epidemic migration that followed maintained the price distortions for years not just in Anchialo, but in other Greek communities, too. There are numerous testimonials for this, for example, the document concerning a village in Burgas area where in 1908 145 Bulgar-

¹³⁶ See *Kpaÿ*, 278, 11.09.1911; 281, 6.10.1911.

¹³⁷ Similar processes accompanied by different degrees of violence have been common in South-Eastern Europe. In the disintegrating Ottoman Empire such was the case with the redesign of the economic status quo between the Muslim and the Greek communities in Crete during the end of the 19th and the early 20th c. (See S. Poullos, "The Muslim Exodus from Crete (1889-1912): Property Loss and Destruction, Urbanization and Counter-Violence", Paper presented at the International Colloquium *Rival Pursuits, Common Experiences: Social Transformation and Mass Mobilization in the Balkan & Eastern Mediterranean Cities (1900-1923)*, Institute for Mediterranean Studies/FORTH & Dept. of History and Archeology, University of Crete Rethymno (Crete), 22-24 October 2009.)

ian families had already bought out *all* the lands of the Greeks¹³⁸. Particularly telling was the complaint of the Greeks from Anchialo to the Parliament that the State tax collector used to sell the properties of emigrants at low prices in order to cover their debts¹³⁹. They insisted that these sales stopped as the owners were expected to return. According to *Krai*, the implicit aim of the complaint was to protect high price levels so that the few Greeks who had remained could ‘snatch the money and leave with them’. The assumption was that the majority had left and it was only a matter of time for the rest to follow. Even if this interpretation was partial, its economic logic was rational. The questions asked were reasonable: if the Greeks intended to stay why didn’t they buy the properties cheaply, but wanted to sell instead; why any wealthy citizen ‘does not buy the cheap property from the tax collector, but seeks to sell it?’ This archetypical definition of the ‘buyer’s market’ was present yet in another commentary made in relation to supposed hidden plans of the Greeks. The petition for the salt excise reduction was interpreted as an attempt to valorise the significantly undervalued land properties before the final exodus. ‘If 8 000 salt production facilities go into other hands’, the newspaper wrote, ‘and if the excise is reduced, the prices of the salterns will raise with 100 leva or more each and from 8.000 facilities the salt producers will take out of Bulgaria 800.000 unmerited leva’¹⁴⁰. Bebis, the banker from Russe also spoke about the forced sales at a loss in the tense summer of 1907. He claimed that all Greeks wanted to emigrate not so much because of the physical, but because of the ‘moral’ terror¹⁴¹. Being afraid of an anti-Greek movement in Varna, Bebis himself sold his properties and was preparing to leave Russe for good. He had heard that the other Greeks were preparing to do the same and ‘if this is true, the ones who sell will regret, not the ones who buy’¹⁴².

¹³⁸ ЦДА, 166/1/1011, fol. 138, 6.11.1908 – Directorate of Confessions, A petition of the Orthodox Bulgarians from the village of Muradanlii, Kazalgach county, to the Governor of the region in Burgas.

¹³⁹ *Krai*, 170, 7.03.1909.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 160, 24.11.1908.

¹⁴¹ Bebis himself was a victim of the riots. His house was plundered during the anti-Greek protest in Russe on 30th July 1906 (the day on which the pogrom in Anchialo took place) (See *Bulgaria* newspaper, issue 78 of 1st August 1906).

¹⁴² ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 84, 9.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

In such market situation sellers are put in unfavourable position, while buyers are in a position to dictate the conditions. Having in mind that the assets were offered by Greeks and bought by Bulgarians, it is clear how circumstances were being created for ‘market-driven Bulgari-sation’ of the freed economic area.

Property rights. What market instigated spontaneously was reinforced by legal and administrative manipulations through spoliation which accompanies all substantial restructuring of an economic realm¹⁴³. It completed the shaping of the large-scale redistribution of assets in the aftermath of the pogrom.

Krai newspaper discussed the methods used with delight, as most of them incriminated the ruling influential Greeks. Based on its publications we can compile a list of the ways in which the absentee lawful owners could be deprived of their ownership or of the produce of their property. The first one was the simple theft of grapes from the vineyards of the Greeks who fled in 1906-1907. This was a public secret and was also diligently documented during one of the inspections of Anchialo municipality¹⁴⁴. Issuing of made-up certificates and orders while applying the Law for Exchange of the Turkish Property Right Documents with Title-deeds, had more serious implications. The forged documents delivered by the municipal authorities resulted in actual appropriation of the émigré’s lands. A long list of cases includes issuing of false certificates; appropriation; deprivation of inheritance right; acquisition of title-deeds for alien salterns; cancellation of debts; acquiring of documents for ownership (and thus enabling subsequent sale) of burned down properties for which before the fire the property right was not proved¹⁴⁵... These practices were confirmed also by other sources¹⁴⁶. The essential point is that such acts were far from benefiting only Bulgarians. Main players in these frauds were often Greeks or their ‘allies’. *The marauding of property amongst*

¹⁴³ The same happened with lands of the Turks who left after the Liberation, with the Jewish properties after the enactment of the antisemitic laws, and with properties of the Bulgarian Turks after their actual deporting in 1989.

¹⁴⁴ *Kpai*, 147, 26.08.1908.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 148, 2.09.1908.

¹⁴⁶ *ЛЛЛ*, 322/1/169, fol. 43, 6.05.1907 – A telegram of Burgas Governor of Region...; *ibid.*, fol. 66, 7.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

members of the persecuted community, e.g. against their own ethnic group looks like a current practice. Ownership does not tolerate empty space and whenever such appears, it is filled up in one way or another.

The property abuses were widespread but in the initial years, when migrants' mobility in both directions was still intensive, this often caused sharp conflicts upon the return of the owners. The gradual legitimization of property rights went through 'drift sands'. The pogrom forced the Greeks to carry out for a long time schizophrenic lives, to identify themselves with two places and to have *de facto* two citizenships, two real estates and two life plans.

Thus, in the summer of 1907 some 400 families from Anchialo were expected in Athens in October. They were still in the town in order to collect the crops and to sell their own property as well as this of their fellow emigrants who had already left¹⁴⁷. At the same time, the Diplomatic Agency in Athens remarked on the insignificant number of refugees (only 106) who presented letters of attorney for the certification needed to selling their properties in Bulgaria¹⁴⁸. The highest share amongst them was of people from Anchialo which is yet another proof of the link between the strength of the anti-Greek movement and the decision to emigrate. Two years later the hesitation seemed to have lessened as the Greek consul in Burgas certified 184 letters of attorney which authorised migrants from Anchialo (including municipal councillors) to accept on behalf of the principals the land made available by the Greek Government¹⁴⁹. This double position provoked an increasing irritation amongst the Bulgarians. They raised the issue of civic loyalty asking if 'anything good might be expected from compatriots who acquire land in Greece, hate our country and day and night dream about Hellas'. A typical time inconsistency problem emerged in which the short- and long-term goals came into conflict with each other. The property, civic and political rights of an important part of the Greeks in Anchialo remained unclear and by consequence, their involvement with the long-term problems of the town declined. 'The emigrants were only interested in temporary questions such

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 75, 16.08.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens (D. Rizov) to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions (D. Stanchov).

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, fol. 85, 9.06.1907 – A report of the Diplomatic Agency in Athens...

¹⁴⁹ *Край*, 174, 11.04.1909.

as selling their property in Anchialo'; they 'are not interested in the wellbeing of the town'¹⁵⁰. The discontent against the municipal councillors who were considered non-permanent residents was particularly acute.

The hybrid economic status of the Greeks from Anchialo after the pogrom (and elsewhere, too) began to destabilise the traditional status quo between the two communities. The fuzziness and the split of the perspective weakened the positions of the Greek community. Although the effects were not immediately visible, in the course of a few years the old political economy of the inter-ethnic co-existence eroded irreversibly.

Economic visions: 'Bulgarisation' and economic future. In addition to market forces and property manipulations, organised social forces also worked for the change in the traditional ethnic balance. During the peak of the unrest against the Greek community radical slogans were raised by crowds appealing to its total removal from the country's political and economic life. In the beginning those were a predominantly 'street mood'. After the climax, they were gradually replaced by better thought-over and more complex social engineering projects which had similar goals, albeit pursued with different means.

In the course of the events the most extremist chauvinistic and aggressive demands (some in almost racist tone) were expressed by Petar Dragulev's organisation 'Bulgarian patriot'¹⁵¹. They were taken up and used in many public gatherings and newspapers including *Krai* in Anchialo. The resolutions included a standard set of ultimatums and threats, for example, boycotting everything and everyone Greek (such as lawyers, doctors, commissioners, tradesmen, craftsmen, landlords, workers, hotels, restaurants, accommodation); dismissing the Greeks at Bulgarian service¹⁵², 'Bulgarisation' of the Black Sea coast... The purely economic demands

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 208, 28.11.1909.

¹⁵¹ See Ks. Kotzageorge-Zimare, *Hoi Hellenes tes Voulgarias...*; Н. Проданов, "Антигръцкото движение във Варна през 1906 г...."

¹⁵² In order to prepare a reply to the Patriarch's Memorandum, a list of the Greeks public servants in Bulgaria (incl. at municipal positions) was prepared. Their total number was 309 of which 126 in the Ministries (the largest number being at the Interior and the War Ministries) and 182 mayors, province and municipal councillors. In 1906 in Anchialo the mayor and 12 municipal councillors were Greeks. (See ЦДА, 166/1/1011, fol. 108 – Directorate of Confessions, A list of Greeks at Government or Municipal service in the Kingdom; *Положението на Гърците в България...*, 12-13.)

called even for appropriation (including nationalisation) of the Greek public establishments and properties. As far as Anchialo particularly was concerned, there were demands for taking away the salterns and pound nets from the Greek leaseholders and leasing them solely to Bulgarians. In political plan the passwords were: ‘they are not going to be considered Greeks anymore, we are all Bulgarians!’ and ‘reject the Patriarchy!’¹⁵³ Committees for helping the (Bulgarian) Anchialo victims emerged spontaneously. It is difficult to say how effective the boycott was, but immediately after the events there were complaints (mainly from foreign citizens) about threats and forced obstruction to purchasing in Greek shops¹⁵⁴.

Beyond the loud slogans, the Bulgarian community in Anchialo was quick to adopt more realistic and efficient strategies for restructuring of the assets to its own benefit. A mere two weeks after the fire, they promoted the idea that ‘in order to rebuild the town significant changes in its population are needed. Everything should be expropriated and then sold again in accordance with a new plan and not according to the old one’¹⁵⁵. In September there were already open talks about a re-design of the burned town as a first step of its ethnic take over. *Krai* newspaper opposed the decision to build temporary shelters for the victims of the pogrom saying that it would be much better if the Government ‘deals with the planning and regulation of the town by buying out all the small yards and re-selling them to *purely Bulgarian* [my emphasis] owners’¹⁵⁶. It is well-known that ambitious town planning operations lead (most often through speculation) to the drawing of new real estate boundaries and the opportunity the fire provided was immediately seized¹⁵⁷. The idea was taken up a few times and the initial perspective (in the winter of 1907) was optimistic. As the fire destroyed the most hygienic houses, the issue

¹⁵³ ЦДА, 166/1/1010, fol. 12-13, 2.08.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, Minutes from the meetings of the Harmanli citizens and the people from the village of Kazaldzhik; *Krai*, 119, 26.08.1906; 121, 9.09.1906.

¹⁵⁴ ЦДА, 166/1/1011, fol. 11, 9.09.1906– Directorate of Confessions, A letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Ministry of Interior.

¹⁵⁵ *Krai*, 117, 12.09.1906.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 120, 2.09.1906.

¹⁵⁷ Ethnic restructuring (at a much larger scale) is observed for example after the devastating fire of 19th August 1917 in Thessaloniki. The rebuilding of the city in the following years gave space to the Greek population at the expense of the Jewish one. (See M. Mazower, *Salonica. City of Ghosts. Christians, Muslims and Jews, 1430-1950*, Vintage Books, 2004.)

of urban development became acute. The expectation was that ‘there are wealthy people in Anchialo who will start to build their own houses as soon as the plan is officially approved’¹⁵⁸. The reality, however, proved to be different. Four years after the pogrom a town development plan was accepted but no one had yet started to build. The damages were still visible and the wealthier ones (who were supposed to start building) had emigrated while ‘these who stayed here are financially not in a position to do so’¹⁵⁹. The citizens made doomed petitions to the Parliament requesting loans for house rebuilds on the places of the ones destroyed by the fire. They also sent requests to the BNB to allow them to mortgage any newly built building. Very soon the usual view prevailed that rebuilding was a ‘State task/responsibility’, that it should be funded by ‘loans at preferential terms and conditions’ for the settlers¹⁶⁰ and that the damages from the fire could only be remedied by the Government.

The ‘Bulgarisation’ projects actually outstripped the borders of the town and grew into a true ideology of ‘internal colonisation’. Such was the spirit of the legislative ban of 1906 for the foreigners to acquire property rights in rural areas. Although officially, any link of these measures with the anti-Greek events was denied and emphasis was laid on the fact that they concerned all foreigners, it is not difficult to see their real aim. The owners of such properties were given three years to sell them or to become Bulgarian citizens. This meant that in a town such as Anchialo (where most of the inhabitants owned fields and vineyards) the Greeks would be forced to sell (cheaply) their assets. Locally, the Bulgarian community quickly expressed sympathy for the nationalistic economic programme of P. Dragoulev which proposed populating of the ‘Greek’ towns, including Anchialo, with Bulgarians (of course, with the support of interest-free credit from the State)¹⁶¹. The prospect looked promising when ‘thousands of workers ... from different parts of Bulgaria [came] to gather the grapes from the vineyards’¹⁶². They were regarded as a flow which could fill up the gap created by the emigration. But here, too, events

¹⁵⁸ *Kpai*, 143, 28.02.1907.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 232, 26.05.1910.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 151, 24.09.1908.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 121, 9.09.1906.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 151, 24.09.1908.

did not happen as expected and already in 1910 it was humbly accepted that ‘people from outside would hardly come here to build’ and without State interference the prospect was that Anchialo remained ‘for eternity deserted and empty as it is now’¹⁶³. The de-population of the town after the pogrom defined for a long period its economic potential.

In a surge of mobilising optimism after the calamity, the economic future of Anchialo was initially regarded as bright. A series of three editorials of *Krai* newspaper described an idyllic picture of the prospects¹⁶⁴. Extrapolating the wellbeing from before the fire, the newspaper drew pictures of flourishing salt production, vine growing and agriculture. Indeed, there were signs of revival. Thus, the change in the salt trade regime in 1908 created fears that the removal of the monopoly would lead to speculation and that the lower customs duty levels would benefit foreign competitors. The fight which the people from Anchialo took up in trying to preserve the monopoly regime was lost, but at the same time, the effect of the new law was not catastrophic. The data on salt production show an increase and in 1909 a record yield was registered (see *Table 2* in the *Appendix*). There were also other symptoms of intensifying economic activity, such as, for example, the founding of ‘Cherno more’ (Black Sea) Ltd (the future ‘Bulgarian Black Sea Bank’).

Overall, however, the local economy did not develop according to the expected positive scenario. Until the wars the demographic gap was still not filled up and at the turn of the new decade the economic situation of the town continued to bear the stigmas of decline. One of them was a direct result of the pogrom and was connected with the still visible damages. Water supply, hygiene and the housing problem continued to be main concerns of the municipal authorities. The other ‘curses’ came from the nature. A big infrastructure project was needed, after a flood destroyed the ‘seta’ (a barrier between the town and the sea). Then the filloxera came. By 1913 there were only 1000 decars of unaffected vineyards left (from about 10.000) which strongly resembled the situation in another ‘Greek’ vine growing town, Stanimaka¹⁶⁵.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 232, 26.05.1910.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 123, 23.09.1906; 124, 30.09.1906; 125, 7.10.1906.

¹⁶⁵ See M. Христевова, “Антигръцкото движение...”

Power. The balance in the political representation was affected in the very first days after the pogrom. Although officially the Mayor Stavridis still remained at his position, he was put under investigation. There were only two municipal councillors who remained – the rest emigrated or were indicted. The new Municipal council after the October election was already composed by 8 Bulgarians and 6 Greeks. The self-confident tone was also a novelty: amongst the Bulgarians one could hear that ‘the times of Stavraki are irreversibly gone’. The turn, however, was not definitive. At the next elections in 1908 the Greeks continued to dominate and the ‘Greek supporter’ I. Hristov was again elected Mayor with the votes of 11 Greek councillors and of ‘two Bulgarians who co-operated with the Greeks’¹⁶⁶.

In a sense 1909 was a turning point. The elections were held in a different system (proportional representation) and the chairmen of the voting sections’ commissions were from outside (Sliven and Yambol). The issue of the ‘voting tourism’ was raised more and more acutely. The demand was that all emigrants should be removed from the voting lists; those that had properties in Greece should lose their suffrage right. The aim was to prevent the ‘double economic life’ of the migrants to be transformed into double political representation. A key leverage was the issuing of passports allowing the Greeks who left for good to vote in Bulgaria. At the end of the day, the issue was settled in 1911¹⁶⁷ when all the Greeks who migrated to Greece after 1906 were removed from the lists.

The effects of the pogrom turned the municipality into an even more sensitive centre of economic power. With a relatively more balanced ethnic split, the ethnic origin (or support) of the Mayor turned him into a decisive arbitrator between the competing ‘Greek’ and ‘Bulgarian’ clans. The position gave access to the ‘business’ of dealing with the properties of the emigrants. Actually, together with other favours and conflicts of interest, an inspection in 1909¹⁶⁸ established that the municipality provided to ‘close people’ certificates with fictitious numbers based on which the court issued property deeds.

¹⁶⁶ *Kpai*, 151, 24.09.1908.

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 277, 4.09.1911.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 199, 3.12.1909 and the following issues.

There were also changes in the main power vector: the salt production. The Greek community continued to keep the leverages but in 1912 Bulgarians already felt enough self-confident to request the closure of the salt registry said to be managed by a 'foreign citizen'. The mistrust to this ethnically dominated institution was obvious. It was proposed to either establish a new, 'more representative' registry, or to transfer its functions under the customs, e.g. under Bulgarian authorities¹⁶⁹.

Finally, the pogrom unleashed processes which gradually changed the asymmetrical balance in the ecclesiastical and educational area. Let do not forget that from the point of view of the 'ethnic microeconomy' they were important mostly as facilitating access to assets and money flows which gave considerable political and economic power. The violence of 1906 without a doubt provoked fear and motivated certain municipalities to join the Exarchate. A well-known case was this of the Anchialo's county village Dautli (Kableshkovo) where such a decision was made only days after the fire. The same step was undertaken by the church community in Mesemvria (Nessebar). But nothing was final and the rivalry continued. Only two months later 185 residents of Mesemvria sent a request to the Ministry of Interior and Confessions claiming they left the Patriarchate under threats that 'they will suffer the same as the people of Anchialo if they do not give up being members of the Greek Orthodox Church'¹⁷⁰. Then they had 'unwillingly' signed the declaration of 'acceptance' to join the Exarchate but wanted protection and refuted the decision taken 'by force, even by cheating'. We feel here the hand of the Greek Consulate in Burgas which in August 1906 started to give away aid to the victims from Anchialo only against a declaration that they refused to join the Exarchate or, if they had joined, to declare that it had been done 'by force'¹⁷¹. The opposite cases were registered as well. The church status, for example, of the Bulgarians who bought all the land from the Greeks in the village of Muradanlii (Mamarchevo) in Kazulgatch/Elhovo county was not final, too. They had 'no access to the dwelling of

¹⁶⁹ ЦДА, 166/1/1012, fol. 197, 29.10.1906 – Directorate of Confessions, A petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions from the undersigned people from Mesemvria, Bulgarian citizens.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁷¹ Край, 119, 26.08.1906.

the Lord... because it was said to be Greek'¹⁷². The Bulgarian authorities did not take the content of the letter at face value and before any decision was adopted they commissioned a check of the signatures as well as data on the number of Bulgarians in the village. The fragile (dis)balance was seen in a range of other details.

Given the history of Anchialo, the management of the property of (and around) the monastery of St. George's was most emblematic. After the pogrom, it stayed governed by the Permanent Regional Commission in Burgas and the issue of making use of its assets came up periodically. The monastery fields were let (for 4 years); there were discussions of the monastery's transformation into an exemplary agricultural school; its farm was opened and then closed... By 1914, though, the time had come to put an end to this unclear situation. The power dominance of the Bulgarian ethnic group was already prominent enough and it took unilateral decisions. All the three options considered were to its benefit: giving away (and purchasing) of the monastery farm land to (by) newly arrived Bulgarian refugees from Thrace; appropriation of the monastery by the municipality and the school board; transfer of the monastery to the ownership of the State¹⁷³. In its penultimate issue¹⁷⁴ *Krai* newspaper asked directly the question 'Whom should the monastery 'St. George' belong to?' and suggested a scheme in which the traditional model remained unchanged but only the ethnic group in charge differed. It was proposed to give the monastery to the (we should understand Bulgarian) Anchialo municipal council and, as before the incomes went to the Greek community they would now flow towards the Bulgarian one (mostly to serve the educational needs). The assets and the financial flows of one of the two key pillars of the economic power were about to be taken away from their previous owner.

The discussion took place after the Balkan wars, just two months past the outbreak of the 'European' one. Those events had changed fundamentally the configuration of the ethnic power vectors but the ambience in Anchialo (and in the whole country) seemed to have returned to

¹⁷² ЦДА, 166/1/1011, fol. 138, 6.11.1908 – A petition of the Orthodox Bulgarians...

¹⁷³ *Krai*, 323, 14.05.1914.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 327, 25.09.1914.

the starting point. The ‘anti-Greek movement’ was back on the agenda; the rhetoric used the familiar vocabulary from 1906; once again churches, monasteries and schools were taken over and once again a hypocritical concern was shown to the ethnic Greeks-Bulgarian subjects; the local ‘tolerance’ was opposed anew to the intolerance of ‘the other’... The fundamental change with regards to the economy was the *inflow* of ethnic Bulgarians refugees who, besides, vigorously supported the anti-Greek movement. In January 1914 some 150 families arrived. They brought different livelihoods to Anchialo (sericulture and agriculture) but the essential point was that these people would turn out to be the ‘Bulgarian’ replenishment of the empty demographic niche. In a spontaneous way the implementation of the old colonisation plan began and in the years between the wars it would unfold as a true two-directional exodus.

3. BETWEEN THE WARS

Many of the processes unleashed by the pogrom in Anchialo spread after the end of the First World War. The new geopolitical situation created conditions for an *organised* ‘final solution’ of the ‘Greek issue’ in Bulgaria and of the ‘Bulgarian issue’ in Greece. This was done on the basis of impressive international legal constructs and in parallel to them – on the basis of purposeful domestic policies. The first followed the new doctrine of ‘reciprocal and voluntary’ migration. The second one, whose ideology and practices were particularly well studied by T. Dragostinova¹⁷⁵ focused all the tools at their disposal to ‘nationalise’ e.g. to assimilate the minorities. The ultimate goal of both was to reach an as fully as possible ‘ethnic cleansing’ and homogenisation of the nation-states.

In this part I sketch some impacts of those policies on the Greek community in Anchialo and more generally – on the economic activity of the ethnic Greeks in Bulgaria. To summarise, the purpose is to capture the reality of what meant to be Greek and to make business in Bulgaria during the inter-war period.

¹⁷⁵ T. Dragostinova, “Speaking National...”; Eadem, “Navigating Nationality...”

Demography. The relevant demographic data are presented in Table 7 (see *Appendix*). It demonstrates that by 1934 68% of the population of Anchialo was Bulgarian and the Greek presence (without being erased) was reduced to 25%. Around 1/4th of the Greeks were more or less naturalised (they accepted Bulgarian as their mother tongue). This drastically altered structure was a result of three powerful trends: a considerable inflow of Bulgarian refugees from abroad (mostly from the geographical borders of Thrace [immediately after the war] and Macedonia [after 1926]) whose localisation in different settlements is well-visible; migration to Greece in the framework of the exchange of population envisaged by the Treaty of Neuilly and by the Mollov-Kafandaris agreement; inflow of Bulgarians from within the country – almost all the Greek inhabitants of Anchialo were born in the city, while 27% of the Bulgarians were born elsewhere.

The statistics shows that if between 1910 and 1920 the town had practically not changed its population, after the war a demographic expansion started. It resulted in the number of inhabitants in 1934 reaching the level of the year of the pogrom. For eight years (1926-1934) the number of buildings doubled. Areas inhabited by refugees appeared in the town, such as, for example, the quarter of Harmanite. The village of Paparos (Sarafovo) emerged nine kilometres away, towards Burgas, where since 1921 refugees from Thrace settled down¹⁷⁶.

The ethnic profile of the land property also changed its structure. On the territory of the county outside the town the Bulgarian property visibly dominated over the Greek one in 1934. (The second most important ethnic group were the Turks). The number of farms owned by Greeks remained considerable amongst the population of Pomorie (Anchialo) where the ratio to the Bulgarians was approximately 1:4. Measured by the land owned though, the ratio was 1:5. This indicates that the size of the 'Bulgarian' farmlands was bigger: amongst them the statistical mode was 30-40 decars whilst among the Greek ones it amounted to 10-20 decars.

Fifteen years after the end of World War I Anchialo was already a definitely Bulgarian town and the change of its name in 1934 came as a consecration of the new power balance.

¹⁷⁶ ГДС, *Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1926*, София, 1930, с. 2.

Migration: people and assets. The main peculiarity of the post-war migration to Greece compared to the emigration after the pogrom was its voluntary character and the attempt to proceed in an orderly way. The 'regulated' flow however did not eliminate the market distortions. Besides, spontaneous migration did not stop completely.

The legal basis for the migration was the Convention on Voluntary Migration signed together with the Neuilly Peace Treaty on 27th November 1919. The institutional framework was provided by the Joint Bulgarian/Greek Emigration Commission. Its archive is a particularly valuable source of information about the geographic, social and economic profile of the Greeks leaving the country. The standard application forms filled in by each emigrant contained documents attesting their right of property over the land, the paid off taxes, the debts and the prices at which their property was sold. It was the refugee's choice whether to sell his estate individually or through the Commission. In both cases the emigration created the effect of oversupply known from the period after the pogrom. Here some additional difficulties occurred, connected to the subjectivity of the asset pricing, the rush to evaluate them, disorders in the handling of the cases by the bureaucrats in the Commission... All these resulted in conflicts, in attempts to circumvent the rules or in 'soft' compromises. From either side, the political and economic interests of the State were also involved. Political considerations often blocked the work of the Commission which was used to apply pressure in relation to other unsolved diplomatic issues between the two countries. In turn, the economic concern of both Bulgaria and Greece was to reduce their respective liabilities vis-à-vis the emigrants¹⁷⁷.

The impressive archive containing the files of the migrants is classified also in accordance with their origin.. The list of those from Anchialo¹⁷⁸ contains 267 names grouped into 7 folders. (Applications had

¹⁷⁷ According to the agreements, 10 % of the emigrants' estates had to be paid in cash by the country they are leaving. For the rest 6% Government bonds were issued. It was foreseen that after the term of the Commission the country with greater liabilities would repay the difference to the other. (See Г. Димитров, *Малцинствено-бежанският въпрос в българо-гръцките отношения 1919-1939*,) Благоевград, 1982.)

¹⁷⁸ ЦДА, 719/7/93 – Joint Bulgarian-Greek Emigration Commission, A list of the files of Greek emigrants from Bulgaria (Anchialo).

been submitted up to July 1931¹⁷⁹. The detailed study of all the files is a promising task but here only a random sample was reviewed. In the folder Nr 7 one find 32 entries (14% of all from Anchialo) and with certain simplification we can accept it as representative (not in statistical terms) about the type of problems.

The brief biographical information contained in the files clearly suggested a link between the new migration wave and the first one. Many emigrants had settled in Greece for years and they authorised lawyers in Sofia and Athens to represent them in front of the Commission. There were a number of declarations from Anchialo citizens who had left after the events of 1906. For them the mediation of an institution recognised by the two sides was a way to finally legalise under comparatively clear rules the property transfer. In ant case, we encounter 'extending', renewal and diversification of the 'chains of emigration' which were formed earlier. There were many group migrations (and by consequence collective hiring of attorneys) which also suggest epidemic character of the process.

The sense of urgency and anxiety surrounding the departure (similarly to 1906) left the buyers in a better position. The structure of the assets sold was typical for the town – houses, farmlands, vineyards and salterns. Almost all properties were burdened with debts, although not so much to financial institutions as to tax collectors, lawyers and, most of all, to the fiscal authorities. The liabilities to the Treasury were deducted from the sales' proceeds. The range of the property valuation was between 2.282 and 624.058 leva which was relatively small.

The archives show that *a big beneficiary of the ethnically freed economic space was the State*. The emigrants' files show the impatience and the 'appetite' of the authorities to benefit from what was on display. A case is documented, for example, in which the authorities confiscated vines and land from a leaving migrant and subsequently gave them away or rented them to Macedonian refugees. The compensation claim of this person (for lost crops and rent) was satisfied by the Commission which gave

¹⁷⁹ Anchialo was not the starting point of the most important flow. There were 333 files for Akalan (Belopolyane, Ivailovgrad region) and 567 for Ahtopol. Obvisouly, what mattered was also the earlier considerable emigrant stream from Anchialo.)

a special compensation of 12% on top of the market price¹⁸⁰. Another emigrant received a certificate from Anchialo municipality that his 'estate... *was appropriated* [my emphasis] for accommodating the refugees installed in the municipality'¹⁸¹. In a third case the State enquires whether the property had been freed as it was in a hurry to use the house for its own purposes. On another occasion the Macedonians emigrants in Bulgaria were accused of terrorising the Greek minority and of plundering its belongings¹⁸². This referred to the practice of the authorities to place Macedonian families (2-3 families) in houses of ethnic Greeks and thus to force them to emigrate. This forced migration led to rushed decisions and deprived the emigrants from the possibility to use the Commission's assistance. In economic terms, the effect was the same as with every mass offer of assets at low prices under conditions that are unfavourable to the seller.

The long shadow of the pogrom followed the Bulgarian State for decades. Memories about 1906 were always a seemingly legitimate basis for claims. A number of emigrants filed such claims against Bulgaria in the Court of Arbitration organized by the Commission. Sometimes they were for considerable amounts of money and the Bulgarian administration took them seriously mobilising its defence without emotions or qualifications. The claims were often without grounds, and excessive¹⁸³, while the Greek citizenship of the claimants at the time of the events was difficult to prove¹⁸⁴. In some cases we see again the marauding of the emigrants' properties by the State and/or by private persons¹⁸⁵.

¹⁸⁰ ЦДА, 719/2/7, fol. 7, 10.03.1926 – Joint Bulgarian-Greek Emigration Commission, Applications of Anchialo citizens.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 5, 13.10.1927.

¹⁸² ЦДА, 322/1/430, fol. 37, 28.06.1924 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece to the Bulgarian Legation in Athens.

¹⁸³ ЦДА, 159/5/104 – Ministry of Finance, Court case of Dimitrios Paskalidis. A rejoinder of D. Paskalidis, 1922, 1931.

¹⁸⁴ Each administration produced the documents it needed. In Bulgaria the authorities issued certificates that the person was not a Greek citizen, while from the Greek Consulates in Bulgaria or from the local authorities in Greece the same person could easily obtain a certificate of being one. The Court of Arbitration was a peculiar institution which had no access to the primary documents and worked only with the information provided by the local institutions.

¹⁸⁵ ЦДА, 159/5/244 – Ministry of Finance, Court case submitted by the legatees of Yani Ekonomos. 1921-1925.

Prior to the implementation of the Convention on the Voluntary Migration, the League of Nations (LN) conducted a study on the potential emigration of the Greeks from Bulgaria¹⁸⁶. The report, which was based on various evaluations and surveys conducted among the population, concluded that the estimates of the Consul of Greece in Burgas about some 22.000 potential emigrants from the region were exaggerated. According to this source, around 20% of the Greeks would remain in the country and the largest number to leave would be from Kavakli (5.500) and Anchialo (2.500 from the town and a total of 3.000 from the county). Inversely, the arguments of the LN's experts were that the reverse migration of those who left after 1906 was still not completed, that the personal decisions would depend strongly on the conditions offered by the Commission, and that the Greek authorities in no way stimulate the immigration. These counter arguments were sweetened by the idyllic picture of the wealth of Anchialo and of the wonderful understanding which reigned amongst the two ethnic groups. The ideology of the report followed closely the traditional theory by postulating that people emigrate mostly from the poorest areas. So, unlike the forecasts of the Consul of Greece, the LN's estimate was for a weak migration potential in the towns (where the social and wealth position of the Greeks was good), for possible movement mainly from the poorer villages (Kavakli and the less developed parts of the Black Sea municipalities) and for a subsequent extinction of the emigration flows. The report quoted Greek estimates according to which the total worth of the property owned by Greeks in Bulgaria amounted to 6.5 billions of golden drachmas¹⁸⁷. More important than this figure (impossible to verify) was the quoted estimate that in the beginning of the 1920s the trend of the market prices for the land sold by the Greeks was clearly downward, at least partly due to the forthcoming migration.

The actual emigration level confirmed the more moderate predictions. The total number of emigrants' files was 16.311¹⁸⁸. As of 1 June

¹⁸⁶ ЦДА, 719/19/24, fol. 185 cfol., 10.04.1922 – Joint Bulgarian-Greek Emigration Commission, Rapport du Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations sur la mission en Bulgarie.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 689, 19.04.1922 – Complément au Rapport du Secrétaire Général de la Société des Nations sur la mission en Bulgarie. Procès-verbal de la 101^e Session.

¹⁸⁸ ЦДА, 719/7/83-93 – Joint Bulgarian-Greek Emigration Commission, A list of the files of Greek emigrants from Bulgaria.

1929, 17347 applications were deposited and the properties of 10783 persons were liquidated¹⁸⁹. These figures exceed the real one as they include both the pre-war and the post-war migration waves. From one side the files include those who had already settled in Greece before 1920 and used the Commission only to arrange the property issues. From another, as suggested by many sources, despite of their obligation to leave the country within three months from obtaining a permission, for various reasons many of the applicants changed their minds, stayed in Bulgaria and were wanted by the authorities in order to be expelled from the country¹⁹⁰.

After 1923 the problem with the Greek emigration from Bulgaria was absorbed in the much more significant movement/exchange of people in the region caused by the war in Asia Minor. Its macroeconomic implications were considerable for both countries and the LN accorded its aegis for the Refugee loans to both Bulgaria¹⁹¹ and Greece. The complicated engineering of these loans only confirmed the macroeconomic puzzle created by the refugee problem and the international financial innovation it necessitated.

Those who stayed. The fate of the Greek minority in Anchialo after the exchange of population in the 1920s is not a subject of the present study. But sketching some important features of the economic and social status of the Greeks who remained in Bulgaria is a natural epilogue of what started with the pogrom of 1906.

Dragostinova convincingly describes the ambiguous situation of the Greek community which during the interwar period was forced to choose between assimilation and the compromises of the low profile in an in-

¹⁸⁹ Г. Димитров, *Малцинствено-бежанският въпрос...*, с. 277. As of 1 June 1929, the financial dimension of the population exchange looked as follow: the established worth of the liquidated properties of the Greeks that left Bulgaria amounted to 6.3 mln. USD and the worth of the estates of the Bulgarians who emigrated from Greece was 18.3 mln. USD. So Greece became a net debtor to Bulgaria. The final settlement was signed on 19 August 1931: the mutually agreed liability of Greece amounted to 7.1 mln. USD. (See *ibid.*, p. 277, 293.)

¹⁹⁰ Т. Dragostinova, "Speaking National...", p. 176; Eadem, "Navigating Nationality..."; ЦДА, 176/22/210, fol. 3, 1927 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions, A memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Governors of Regions; *Ibid.*, fol. 1, 2.05.1927 – A letter of the Commission mixte d'émigration gréco-bulgare to the Foreign Minister; ЦДА, 370/6/734, fol. 4, 19.08.1939 – Police Directorate, A confidential letter of the Commander of the 3rd Army to the Ministry of War and the General Staff.

¹⁹¹ See Р. Аврамов, *Комуналният капитализъм*, I.

creasingly nationalistic surrounding. Even after the number of the Greek language speakers in Anchialo was reduced to about 1.000 people, social memory retained the traces of the former conflicts and the Bulgarian majority did not miss any opportunity to demonstrate its self-confidence as the new master of the situation. The local authorities and press (now different to the stylistics of *Krai*) set the new rules according to which Anchialo was an ethically ‘clean’ small town with Bulgarian roots; one which had broken with the previous annoying Greek presence¹⁹². However, the smouldering ethnic tension was easy to inflame. Thus, shortly after the coup of 19th May 1934, in a fit of overzealousness, the County director of Anchialo banned the ‘speaking and singing’ in Greek and Turkish languages in public places in town¹⁹³. The ‘bottom-up’ initiative was obviously inspired by the nationalistic tone of the new regime. The measure was motivated by the ‘bad impression’ which Bulgarian citizens who speak Bulgarian language created by not using it; by the ‘undermined national esteem of every Bulgarian’, by the perception that the county was some ‘foreign province’ and by the need to ‘preserve the prestige of and the respect for the Bulgarian State’. The immediate intervention of the Greek Legation in Sofia and of the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs moderated the order, however, preserving the ban to speak a foreign language in the state institutions¹⁹⁴. If the situation in Anchialo was settled in a relatively peaceful way, the ‘overly strict measures undertaken by the authorities’ against the local Greeks in the border village of Oreshetz (Harmanli district) led to incidents involving illegal border crossing into Greece¹⁹⁵. Once again, emigration propaganda coaxing that ‘life in Greece is better’ had already started to spread across the border (actually, across divided families). In order to stop it, the Bulgarian authorities resorted to ‘exceptional’ police solutions (including assigning the most active associates to residence in distant places of the country) ‘with the aim of scaring off [the local Greeks] thus preventing them from providing hospitality’.

¹⁹² See different issues of *Chernomorski glas* newspaper.

¹⁹³ *ЦДА*, 176/22/355, fol. 4, 11.04.1934 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions, Order № 67 of Anchialo County Administration.

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 3, 21.06.1934 – Order № 76 of Anchialo County Administration.

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, fol. 7, 1.12.1936 – A letter of the Regional Administration of the Ministry of Interior (Stara Zagora) to the Ministry of External Affairs and Confessions.

These episodes are indicative of how potentially explosive ethnic conflicts were and of the tensions between the two countries with regards their minorities' problems¹⁹⁶. Little by little, the situation created an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion towards the Greek minority in Bulgaria. (The attitudes towards the Bulgarians in Greece were identical). This was clearly visible as early as the mid 1930s, but with the approaching and the outbreak of World War II they became truly paranoid. The political police and the counter-intelligence services prepared regular reports on the 'foreign propaganda' containing information about the Greeks, alongside with that concerning the Turks, the Jews or the Wallachs; about the religious proselytism; the Jewish communities; the foreign political émigrés, missions and colonies in the country; about the foreign intelligence's doings. The Greek diplomats were subject to continuous surveillance, all their contacts and pettiest activities were reported¹⁹⁷. The language of these police pieces of information remind both of the past and the future. They remind of the past with the recycling of the terminology known from 1906 in which the main disturbers of the order were the 'fanaticised Greeks'. And what was about to happen in only after a few years was detectable in the tone, the style, the vocabulary and the way of thinking of the authors of the reports which strikingly bring to mind the language of the communist files. The agents were even assigned the tasks of intellectual police - they prepared, for example, detailed notes on the content and the 'incorrect' statements (mainly as regards the ownership of the monasteries in the area) of historical studies printed in Greece and distributed without the consent of the censorship by the teacher Kirios Apostolidis from Plovdiv¹⁹⁸. Another resemblance with the communist regime was the constant references to the 'monolithic' demands of the citizens against the suspicious elements such as the passionate demand to

¹⁹⁶ See A. Wurfain, *L'échange Gréco-bulgare des minorités ethniques*, Lausanne, 1923; Г. Димитров, *Малцинствено-бежанският въпрос...*

¹⁹⁷ See for example, ЦДА, 370/6/1191, fol. 2, 10 – Police Directorate, Reports on the surveillance of the Greek consul in Varna. 1939-1940; 370/6/1177, 14.12.1939 – Reports of the Plovdiv provincial department of the State Security to the State Security (division B), Sofia on the foreign propaganda in Bulgaria. 1939-1940.

¹⁹⁸ ЦДА, 370/6/1177, fol. 3, 11.02.1939 – Police Directorate, Reports of the Plovdiv provincial department of the State Security to the State Security (division B), Sofia, on the foreign propaganda in Bulgaria. 1939-1940. K. Apostolidis (1868-1942) was born in Plovdiv. He studied in his native town and obtained degrees of Philosophy in Athens and of Philology

‘clean’ Plovdiv ‘from all these unreliable Greeks... who are a danger for our State security’¹⁹⁹. The police documents carefully measured the pulse of ‘the mood’ of the minority. One of the many reports on the ‘foreign propaganda’ (from 1939) noted the fright in Plovdiv ‘after strict measures were taken against some fanaticised Greeks’ who kept their Greek citizenship and put themselves into service to the Greek intelligence and propaganda’²⁰⁰. Another report noted that the increasing tension in the relationship between Bulgaria and Greece immediately raised concerns of a possible deportation²⁰¹. The police used to investigate even the ‘exemplary’ citizens of Greek origin and their relatives. Such was the case of the naturalised Greek Kostadin Hrisu who was one of the wealthiest salt producers in Anchialo. According to the BNB branch in the city, he had ‘a very good reputation... a company... well-known in the town and in Burgas; he is someone who is always regular in his payments, does not incur liabilities’²⁰². Despite these superlative references, every time he would send an invitation to his sister to visit Bulgaria (she was living in Greece as she had left Anchialo in 1906 but still owned a property in town), Hrisu was subjected to careful investigation²⁰³. A possible reason for this was that somewhere in Hrisu’s files there was probably information about his membership in the Supervisory board of St. George’s monastery during the time of the pogrom...

After WW II began, the attitudes in the society and the very status of the Greek minority became entirely paralysing. As early as 1938 the Ministry of interior sent a confidential order to the police officers to ban ‘any indoors or outdoors gathering in which the issue of our minorities

in Munich. Apostolidis taught in Alexandria (1909-1915) and in Athens (1915-1920) before returning in Plovdiv. He was forced to leave Bulgaria for Greece in 1940. His voluminous monograph on the history of Plovdiv (see Kosmas Myrtilos Apostolidis, *He tes Philippoupoleos historia apo arhaiotaton mehri ton kath’emas hronon*, Epimeleia G. A. Megas, En Athenais, 1959) was published posthumously.

¹⁹⁹ ЦДА, 370/6/1177, fol. 50, 19.08.1939 – Reports of the Plovdiv provincial department..

²⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, fol. 71, 13.09.1939.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 13, 8.03.1939.

²⁰² ЦДА, 285/8/3306, fol. 2-11 – BNB, Authorisation of the total credit of Kostadin Hrisu, salt producer, trader of sea salt and rentier, Anchialo. 1934-1935.

²⁰³ ЦДА, 370/6/1106, fol. 1-8 – Police Directorate, File of Hrisanti Anastasopoulo from Athens. 1938-1940.

would be discussed by anyone²⁰⁴. Any manifestation of ‘nationalistic’ positions provoked an easy expulsion from the permanent address and relocation in the country. Such was the case of a Greek from Burgas who was deported ‘lawfully’ (for a second time after 1939) because of his ‘strong Greek patriotism... and suspicion that he co-operates with the Greek intelligence’²⁰⁵. Under different circumstances but with the same ease a citizen of Sozopol was asked to move to another address as he lived near a military base and this was unacceptable for ‘one of the most fanaticised Greeks in the town’. Here the State acted as a trivial expropriator: ‘in view of the ‘current exceptional times’ the military insisted on this man’s relocation from the barracks’ area and that the house was granted to the military base²⁰⁶. Another file shows how stereotypical reports of the Provincial Directorate of the Ministry of Interior informed with an emphatic tone on the ‘temper and the attitude of the population’ paying particular attention to ‘the harmful anti-State propaganda with political, religious, irredentist, anti-national and other orientation’. In the part concerning ‘alien population and non-orthodox religious beliefs’ it was noted that ‘amongst the Greek and the Jewish minority anti-State propaganda has been carried out very skilfully so that they become conductors and disseminators of all sorts of rumours [and so] their activity is the same as the communists’ in this respect²⁰⁷. One report of the County’s police office in Pomorie (Anchialo) pointed out that the important Greek minority in the area was a complicating circumstance against the background of the overwhelming approval of the Government. The Greeks [as the communists] ‘use every limitation for their propaganda’ and – particularly revealing– the landing (of the Allies) in Lampedusa ‘provokes a certain concern [as] the Greek minority in Pomorie shares the joy of the Brit-

²⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 370/1/636, fol. 1, 24.09.1938 – A confidential order of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Heads of Police departments in the provinces of the Kingdom.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 176/22/430, fol. 5, 15.10.1940 – Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions, A report of the Police Directorate (State security department) to the Ministry of External Affairs and Confessions.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 264/1/369, fol. 52, 9.09.1943 – Ministry of Interior, A letter of the General Staff to the Ministry of External Affairs and Confessions.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 264/7/644, fol. 14, 16.02.1943 – Reports of the Burgas Province administration of the Ministry of Interior and Public Health to the Minister.

ons'²⁰⁸. As regards the Greek citizens in Bulgaria, after the occupation of Greece in April 1941 and the departure of the Greek Diplomatic Mission from Sofia, all of them were treated as foreigners without valid documents, regardless of their birthplace²⁰⁹. In this way the special status of a shrinking group of people which played a most active role in maintaining of the Greek national identity was formally removed.

It is clear that in such an environment the Greek community in Bulgaria could not have a normal social and economic life. In 1930s and especially in the beginning of the 1940s every non-Governmental or economic structure was watched for a possible infiltration of communist and of 'alien' elements. Collecting information about the 'honesty', loyalty, national origin, political orientation, anti-State ideas and possible connections with foreign intelligence services of the Board members of those structures was compulsory. A brief look at the different associations in Pomorie (such as the General Trade Association, the Orthodox Christian Brotherhood 'St. Patriarch Evtimii', The Education Association, the Popular Bank of Anchialo...) shows that even if some Greek names appeared among their founders, it was extremely rare to see an ethnic Greek amongst the management, except for the few cases of already fully integrated persons (for example, the previously mentioned K. Hrisu). The exceptions which only served to confirm the rule were allowed only at national level and in the case of very influential persons. The Bulgarian-Greek Association established in Sofia was characteristic in this respect. It was an official structure aiming at the 'development of friendly, cultural and economic relations' between the two peoples. The Association was also subjected to the usual inspections but the composition of its Board unambiguously showed that it served the personal interests of the political establishment: its chairman Bogdan Filov without a doubt was motivated by the potential scientific contacts in the field of archaeology, while the deputy chairman Dimitar Savov – by the business opportunities²¹⁰.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 264/7/654, fol. 1, 2.02.1943; fol. 10, 16.06.1943 – Reports of the Pomorie regional office of the Ministry of Interior and Public Health.

²⁰⁹ See *ibid.*, 370/6/1672, fol. 220, 30.04.1943 – Police Directorate, A report from the Police Directorate to the Ministry of Interior. The Greek passports were not recognised and those persons remained to live in Bulgaria with temporary residence certificates.

²¹⁰ See *ibid.*, 264/5/1021, fol. 8, 7.09.1938 – Ministry of Interior, Statute of the Bulgarian-Greek Association; fol. 11, 30.11.1938 – Certificates for loyalty of the executives of the Bulgarian-Greek Association.

The traces from the ethnic conflict in Anchialo's economic life gradually diluted but did not disappear completely between the wars. The microeconomy of the split is present in data scattered in the archives of various institutions. They all confirm the irreversible takeover by the Bulgarian ethnic group of the space which was once controlled unconditionally by the Greek community.

Particularly sensitive to these processes were the financial establishments in the town, which were monitored by the local BNB branch. Immediately after the end of World War I the office started to demonstrate particular vigilance as to the national colouring of the economic activity. In a letter to the Head Office of the BNB it was noted that one of the main shareholders and managers of the Bulgarian Black Sea Bank (BBSB)²¹¹, Dimo Keremedchiev, was 'the only *Bulgarian* [my emphasis] tradesman who is operating from a long time ago in this area populated exclusively with Greek element'²¹². On a different occasion, the branch reckoned it was necessary to stress the contribution of the BBSB for the 'Bulgarisation' of the economic turnover and noted its intrinsically ethnic mission. 'The shareholders of the bank', the BNB branch wrote in the report, 'are almost all Bulgarians, who founded the bank in order to counteract the alien element which had ruled over the trade here until present'²¹³. BBSB was the smallest but also the only *private* shareholder bank in Anchialo which gathered a limited circle of influential citizens. In this sense the composition of the shareholders was indeed important and the archive data confirm its ethnic profile: from the information collected by the Supervision Authority (The Bankers' Council) we can see that only 6-8 of the names out of the 35 shareholders in 1933 and 1940 were supposedly with Greek origin. (Besides, a Bulgarian suffix has been added to one of the Greek names)²¹⁴. In the Managing Board of the bank, however, there was just one Greek name and the Supervisory Board was always composed only from Bulgarians.

²¹¹ The BBSB inherited the above-mentioned 'Black Sea' JSC. The shareholder company was founded in 1908 and re-named to BBSB in 1918. A detailed study of the development of the bank between the wars can be found in P. Аврамов, *Комуналният капитализъм*, II, 526-579.

²¹² ЦДА, 285/8/869, fol. 402, 23.11.1921 – BNB, Total credit of the Bulgarian Black Sea Bank Ltd (Anchialo/Pomorie). 1921-1941.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, fol. 413, 16.02.1921.

²¹⁴ ЦДА, 602/1/36 – Banks Supervision Authority, File of the Bulgarian Black Sea Bank Ltd, Anchialo, 1932-1940.

The crowding out of the Greeks was not only the outcome of demographic trends. In the new conditions they lost their previous relative security and began to voluntarily avoid visibility in the economic life. In 1928 the BNB branch noted that the town's inhabitants were predominantly 'migrants' from Thrace and Macedonia and although there 'are indeed affluent Greek people, it seems though that they are afraid to deposit their money into our banks and so we cannot expect any revenues from them'²¹⁵. An ethnic motivation was noticeable also years later, when in 1943 the BNB branch asked the Head Office whether it was advisable to accept from ethnic Greeks 3% Treasury Bills in exchange of 5% Government Bonds from the 1941 Loan²¹⁶. This strategy looked suspicious given the fact that according to the branch data the persons in question had banknotes at their disposal. Actually, the issue was that the Greeks did not want to hold Bulgarian Government debt and their preference was (even in conditions of raising inflation) for a precautionary liquidity which (according to economic theory) is a rational guaranty in cases of immediate insecurity. We can add to this the well founded mistrust to the discretion of the Bulgarian financial institutions: the BNB had already allowed the branch to raise the bank secret and provide the police with the names of the persons who cashed coupons from the bonds of the 1923 State loan²¹⁷. The Head Office finally adopted a pragmatic and not an ethnically motivated position on this issue, and ordered for the Treasury bonds to be accepted regardless of their owner's ethnicity.

Overall, the economic archives confirm the declining Greek economic presence. For example, from 30 decisions concerning debtors to the branch of BNB in Pomorie in 1936-1938 only four were for ethnic Greeks (one was for a Turk). There were no noticeable ethnic specifics in the credit activity of the Pomorie Popular Bank or (as registered in the audit results) of the local branch of the Bulgarian Agricultural and Co-operative Bank. Even one of the episodes of the permanent fighting about

²¹⁵ ЦДА, 285/8/869, fol. 389, 28.03.1928 – BNB, Total credit of the Bulgarian Black Sea Bank Ltd (Anchialo/Pomorie), 1921-1941.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 285/8/1658, fol. 253, 13.02.1943 – A report of the BNB's branch in Pomorie to the Head Office of BNB.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, fol. 238, 25.11.1939 – A letter of the Head Office of BNB to the branch of BNB in Anchialo.

dominating positions in the salt production (the conflict of 1933 between the private company 'Glarus' and the General association of the Bulgarian agricultural co-operatives²¹⁸) occurred without involving the ethnic issue.

These trends are better understood against the background of the general attitude towards the economic activity of the foreigners (the Greeks in particular) in the country. The interwar period, especially the Great Depression was times of passionate economic nationalism, and Bulgaria was no exception. In this context, the old ethnic animosity between Greeks and Bulgarians began to look like a particular case of a global problem.

The widely spread spy mania and xenophobia in Europe and in Bulgaria were a simplistic pretext for every act of economic nationalism. The case with the Export Institute was typical. In 1938 it 'works silently for the gradual nationalisation of the export', for reducing the number of foreigners who 'do not observe the confidential character of the instructions and share them with other interested countries', for removal of foreigners whose behaviour and status make them unacceptable²¹⁹. The institution found a suitable occasion to increase its institutional weight and (successfully) demanded to co-operate in 'removing of unwanted and suspicious foreigners by joining the Commission whose task is to prepare their personal files and to decide who is acceptable and who is not'. Given the circumstances, the Export institute forgot its calling to stimulate exports and turned into a lobbying body for ensuring a monopoly position for local exporters²²⁰.

While the control over the foreign citizens in the areas of import and export concerned a small number of Greeks, the Draconian restrictions in domestic retail/wholesale trade had a much more direct effect on them. These regulations, too, were based on the 'national' and anti-liberal spirit of the time: the idea that under the existing conditions it was not

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 165/1/1348, fol. 2-9 – General Association of the Bulgarian Agricultural Co-operatives, On the building of Association's salterns in Anchialo. 1933.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 370/6/92, fol. 4, 2.02.1938 – Police Directorate, A letter of the Export Institute to the Police Directorate.

²²⁰ Similar functions, but regarding the labour market, were assigned to the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. The existing regulations in practice closed the labour market to foreigners and left wide space for arbitrary decisions on each individual case. (See *Ibid.*, fol. 24.)

possible to have 'free market' solutions to the deep economic problems. The bureaucratic expression of this 'spirit' was reduced to a xenophobic administrative order on the status and the economic position of the foreigners who were forced to re-register, to obtain a bulk of permits, to provide detailed trade information, recommendations from the police, certificates of loyalty etc.²²¹ The document provoked an angry reaction from the Greek Legation which insisted that the Greek citizens were treated in a milder way. The argument was not only their poor economic condition but also the fact that a significant proportion of them were a part of the native Greek community in Bulgaria and the order unrightfully put them on equal footing with the foreigners residing temporarily in the country²²². It was precisely *this ambiguity in the status of many Greeks in Bulgaria (their historical association with the country and the citizenship which detached them from it) that made the community vulnerable to all the measures aimed against the foreigners*. On this particular case, the Bulgarian authorities, with utter unwillingness and bad conscience complied with the objections. They issued a grotesque, strictly confidential order to the police officers which instructed them that the domestic trade regulation 'should not be applied in the cases of Greek citizens with the same rigour as it would be applied for other foreigners'. At the same time a warning was given that the other foreigners 'must not' find out about these mitigations. The preferential treatment 'should happen in such a way that [the Greeks] should be left with the impression that it is done because of personal judgement of the police officer and in no way that there were special orders given in this respect'²²³. If on this occasion a compromise was reached, conflicts and complete mistrust prevailed in the majority of the other cases. Examples are the campaigns for the deportation of Greek citizens from Bulgaria and (reciprocally) of Bulgarian ones from Greece in the summer and autumn of 1939²²⁴; the ban for the winter stay of the

²²¹ *Ibid.*, fol. 9-13, 7.10.1937 – A memorandum of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Confessions.

²²² *Ibid.*, 370/6/734, fol. 33, 10.11.1937 – Police Directorate, A pro-memoire of the Greek Legation in Sofia.

²²³ *Ibid.*, fol. 31, 26.01.1938 – A strictly confidential memorandum of the Police Directorate to the Heads of Police departments in the provinces.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, fol. 3-4; 370/6/424, fol. 4, 16.11.1939 – A memorandum of the Police Directorate to the Heads of Police departments in the provinces.

Bulgarian herds in Thrace; the police surveillance of the Greek participation in the Plovdiv fair of 1939 and of its resonance amongst the local Greek community...

Under these circumstances, the choices left to those who remained in the country disappeared. In practice, they had no other possibility for a fool blooded civic and economic life except to be assimilated in the local milieu. Just before the regime shift in 1944 the lack of 'ethnically autonomous' perspective for the Greek community was obvious. The changes that ensued did not create new options. Quite to the contrary – they sealed the long trends which began in 1906.

4. CONCLUSION

The 'Anchialo cycle' can be thought of as an archetypical phenomenon for the Southeast periphery of Europe, because of its driving forces as well as its short- and long-term implications. It is neither the bloodiest nor the most dramatic episode of the ethnic conflicts in the region but it concentrates the main ingredients and the social mechanics of all of them. In this particular case the aggression goes from Bulgarians to Greeks, however, in the Balkans the logic is never one-directional but circular: on this peninsula there are no innocent nationalities and similar stories had happened between every neighbouring couple from the unusually complex ethnic puzzle; each nationalism found justification in another nationalism. The claims of 'inherent' tolerance (or aggressiveness) which were cultivated all-over by the national canon are nothing more than mythologemes. The demons are the same, they easily leave their latent state and under specific circumstances go loose everywhere...

The Anchialo case triggered the classical explosive mixture of ideology and economic interests. The visible passions were enticed through manipulation of the crowds in which the politically instrumentalised historical clichés played a leading role. Without appearing on the scene, history and the historians were actors in the events. Parallel to them, economic forces unfolded, and they tolerated no vacuum. The economic rivalry between the ethnic groups was not a competition between alternative models. The organisation of the economic life of the Greek commu-

nity in Anchialo was in no way different from the Bulgarian pattern of 'communal capitalism'. The struggle between them was a struggle for economic space of the same vein as the fight constantly led by the local political and economic clans. Vacating economic territories through ethnic cleansing is a transparent manifestation of processes which in 'normal' times occur softly, in less conflictive forms and hidden ways. The difference introduced by the ethnic marker is based most of all on the possibility for 'internationalisation' of the conflict, for the involvement of 'outside' powers and, in the end, for an 'external' solution through a mass exodus. After the pogrom in Anchialo such developments occurred only on a limited scale but the scheme was to acquire catastrophic dimensions for the region. Aggressions against minorities, sooner or later, end with migrations. They allow for devaluation and appropriation of assets and for direct economic marauding in which both private interests and the State take part. In this respect, the economic violence against an ethnic minority strongly resembles that of the communist regime.

The 'Anchialo cycle' demonstrates the particular vulnerability of the small minorities. Despite their significant number and tangible economic presence, the Greeks in post-1878 Bulgaria never reached (except at local level) the weight of the Turkish ethnic minority. The large communities within a nation-state resist assimilation: the violent attempts to do so surpass the microeconomic dimensions and often degenerate into macroeconomic catastrophes. For ethnic groups as important as the Greek one was for Bulgaria the dilemma between leaving or being assimilated surges earlier. They are more helpless and the economic/political 'price' of their absorption is often considered irrelevant by the majority.

The ethnic conflicts in the Balkans (and not only there) are rarely closed and completed stories. As the lasting impact of the pogrom in Anchialo shows, these episodes pulsate, they are continuously transformed into precedents and reshaped. During the long 20th century in Bulgaria they mutated in the persecution of the Jews in 1940-1944, in the anti-Turkish violence from the 1980s but also in the currently so tempting nationalistic stance, rhetoric, attitudes and actions...

APPENDIX

Table 1
BUILDINGS IN ANCHIALO MUNICIPALITY

	1900	1905	1910
For living only	864	894	282
For living and other purposes	189	150	104
Including:			
Schools	7	6	2
Churches and monasteries	10	12	4
Workshops and factories	3	10	–
Shops and pubs	104	64	30
Bakeries	8	9	1
For other purposes only	476	446	200
Including:			
Workshops and factories	7	15	4
Shops and pubs	131	94	40
Warehouses	24	52	32
Barns	70	57	28
Bakeries	14	12	–
Water-mills	17	14	6
TOTAL	1 530	1 490	586

Sources:

Главна дирекция на статистиката (ГДС), Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1905, София, 1907.

ГДС, Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1910, София, 1912.

Table 2
ANCHIALO: BASIC ECONOMIC INDICATORS

	Number of salterns	Salt production (kg)
1896	6 272	12 653 892
1897	5 623	2 045 058
1898	7 051	14 099 482
1899	7 638	19 761 468
1900	7 661	2 379 731
1901	7 701	3 759 039
1902	7 699	13 377 569
1903	7 934	11 650 995
1904	8 470	14 810 020

1905	7 573	15 550 430
1906	7 933	1 772 980
1907	7 308	7 157 000
1908	7 308	16 053 170
1909	7 926	27 809 540
1910	7 717	7 223 090
1911	7 976	13 006 040

	1899	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
Import of sea salt (lv.)	219 488	341 330	106 512	207 559	302 410	189 331
	1900	1905	1906	1907	1908	1909
Average market prices of salt (lv./kg)	0.16	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21	
Excise from salt (mln. lv.)						
Forecasted		4.0	6.0	6.0	6.0	4.6
Collected		5.7	6.6	6.6		
Rainfall (mm)						
Varna			535.4	454	439.4	
Haskovo			822.9	487.4	514.4	
Average 1901-1905:						
Varna –						512.5
Haskovo –						525.5

Vine growing (Anchialo county)

	1905	1910
Vineyards (ha)	1 712	1 499
Total grapes production (100 kg)	85 272	25 512
Average grapes yield (100 kg/ha)	50.67	17.09

Trade (Anchialo and Mesemvria ports)

	1901	1902	1903	1904	1905	1906	1907	1908
Import (t)	175	236	190	954	1 272	667	228	226
Export (t)	2 165	1 049	4 122	5 770	8 598	3 824	2 913	1 602

Sources:

ГДС, Статистически годишник на Царство България, 1908, София, 1909.

ГДС, Земеделска статистика. Посеви и реколти. Преброяване от 1905 г., София, 1912.

Г. Тошев, "Публичните влагалища и стоковият кредит в странство и в България", СББАН, XIX, кл. ист.-филол. и филос.-общ., 1925, с. 104.

Table 3

ANCHIALO COUNTY: CREDIT ACTIVITY

BNB(leva)

	1905	1906	1907	1908
Discounted and deposited bills	37 385	52 571	35 517	90 219
Mortgages	86 944	16 795	16 954	14 352
Number	48	20	19	17
Bills				
As of 31 December	9 9401	1 490	10 667	19 729
Annual turnover	37 385	52 569	35 523	90 220
Contested bills as of 31 December	5 110	3 065	260	345
Credits extended through special current accounts	17 228	8 809	5 374	11 268
Repayments of credits through special current accounts	17 396	9 000	6 900	11 194
Amounts outstanding on special current accounts as of 31 December	6 851	6 392	4 567	3639

*BAB**Ranking of the Anchialo branch among the 85 branches of BAB according to:*

	Number of operations	Turnover	Assets	Time deposits	Commissions
1897	66	74	89	83	43
1898	62	50	71	83	46
1899	60	53	60	83	41
1900	58	55	60	83	42
1901	49	41	61	84	42
1902	48	37	55	82	42
1903	49	44	52	82	45
1904	49	38	60	76	45
1905	49	44	49	70	49
1906	60	49	50	70	59
1907	64	52	69	76	69

(leva)

	1904	1905	1906	1907
Amount of operations	9 754 740	7 434 372	8 027 262	7 621 479
Number of operations	7 049	7 391	6 562	6 705
Cash flow	4 536 877	4 519 268	5 066 307	4 701 586
Liabilities to the Head Office (31 December)	494 237	399 115	4 221 990	520 324
Deposits				
Ordinary current accounts	30 933	35 292	74 866	59 365
Time deposits	39 411	61 579	54 619	35 584
Loans				
Guaranteed	408 496	370 695	366 655	359 916
Mortgage	55 176	42 298	56 710	167 720
Special current accounts	3 885	46 892	108 424	98 866
Gross profit		61 993	56 504	77 046
Net profit		31 558	27 571	41 994
Interests paid		13 708	11 475	16 503
Interests received		47 553	39 918	42 402
Assets		862 337	876 755	730 212
Real estates seized from irregular debtors (as of 31 December)	43 322	51 108	42 713	20 089
Assets acquired from irregular debtors		21 445	8 570	20 742
Decrease of the assets from irregular debtors		13 659	15 215	23 665
Assets of irregular debtors held by the branch				
Village houses / (number)		7 275 (5)	5 390 (10)	1 559 (10)
Town houses / (number)		12 392 (6)	12 578 (8)	6 299 (7)
Fields / (number)		16 280	15 311	7 998
		(49)	(113)	(207)
Vines / (number)		603 (13)	409	689 (19)
Salterns / (number)		9 230 (67)	8 111 (58)	

Sources:

Отчети на Българска Земеделска Банка (current issues)

Годишни отчети на Българска Народна Бавка (current issues)

Table 4

ANCHIALO: ETHNIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FIGURES

	1884	1892	1900	1905	1910
Population of Anchialo county (<i>okolia</i>)					
Orthodox	14 469	16 534			
Muslims	7 910	6 760			
Greeks			9 354	9 208	6 240
Population of Anchialo municipality (<i>obshtina</i>)			5 554	5 527	3 304
According to their ethnicity:					
Bulgarians			767	1 061	1218
Greeks			4 579	4 177	1 800
Turks			125	188	77
According to their citizenship:					
Bulgarian			4867	4672	3014
Greek			569	651	114
Turkish			100	120	39

Population of Anchialo <i>municipality</i>			
Born in Bulgaria	5 327	5 214	3 005
In the town	4 664	4 590	2 026
In a different municipality of the same county	258	189	181
In a different county of the same region (<i>okrug</i>)	150	253	341
In a different region of the Kingdom	255	182	457
Born abroad			
Turkey			
Macedonia and Edirne area	149	166	121
Elsewhere		14	14

Sources:

ГДС, *Резултати от преброяване на населението в България на 31 декември 1900. Окръг Бургас, София, 1902.*

ГДС, *Резултати от преброяване на населението в България на 31 декември 1905. Окръг Бургас, София, 1910.*

ГДС, *Резултати от преброяване на населението в България на 31 декември 1910. Окръг Бургас, София, 1913.*

ЦДА, 453/2/2, fol. 1 – Central Statistical Office, Population census as of 31st December 1920. Population according to provinces and counties. Anchialo county.

Table 5

EMIGRANTS FROM ANCHIALO, BURGAS, MESEMVRIA AND SOZOPOL AFTER THE EVENT IN ANCHIALO

Persons who left with Bulgarian passports	
Families	89
Individual persons	40
Passports issued for travel to:	
Greece	55
Turkey	26
Other countries	8
All countries	9
Persons who left with foreign passports	
Families	98
Individual persons	28
Passports	
Greek	108
Turkish	7
Russian	1
Romanian	1

Families and individual persons who left for:	
Greece	86
Turkey	29
Romania	2

Source:

ЦДА, 322/1/161, fol. 13, 30.08.1906 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A confidential report of the Diplomatic Agency in Vienna (Sarafov).

Table 6

EMIGRANTS TO GREECE FROM 1ST AUGUST 1906 to 1ST JUNE 1907

	With passports	Without passports
Burgas region	1 654	5 756
Anchialo	1 002	770
Aitos	440	338
Burgas	191	405
Karnobat	7	25
Kazalgach (Elhovo)	2	4 406
Yambol	4	12
Varna region	218	15
Varna (city)	67	
Varna (county)	140	8
Balchik	11	7
Plovdiv region	1706	790
Plovdiv (city)	92	620
Stanimaka	1 610	170
Peshtera	4	-
Stara Zagora region	9	32
Haskovo	9	7
Harmanli	-	16
Stara Zagora (city)	-	9
Sofia (city)	18	2
TOTAL	3 605	6 595

Source:

ЦДА, 322/1/169, fol. 41, 23.07.1907 – Bulgarian Diplomatic Agency in Athens, A letter of the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Confessions to the Diplomatic Agency in Athens.

Table 7

THE GREEK COMMUNITY IN ANCHIALO/POMORIE, 1920-1934

	1920	1926	1934
Population of Anchialo <i>county</i>	31 995		
Population of Anchialo <i>municipality</i>	3 341	4 327	5 058
Born in Bulgaria	3 212		4 078
In the same town	2 339		2 992
Bulgarians/ Bulgarian language			1 630
Bulgarians /Greek language			18
Greeks/ Bulgarian language			164
Greeks/ Greek language			893
In the same <i>region</i>	121		187
Bulgarians			141
Greeks			37
In another <i>region</i>	762		899
Bulgarians			787
Greeks			68
Born abroad			980
Greek Macedonia	10		434
Greek Thrace	565		
Western Thrace			13
Eastern Thrace			441
Russia	728		19
Ethnicity:			
Bulgarians			3 463
Greeks			1 285
Greek language			995
Bulgarian language			290
Buildings in Anchialo <i>municipality</i>			
The town of Anchialo		575	1 044
'Harmanite' area		45	34
Households in Anchialo <i>municipality</i>			
The town of Anchialo		1 106	1 244
'Harmanite' area		48	184
Farms according to the ethnicity of the owners (number)			
Anchialo <i>county</i>			
Bulgarian			4 369
Other (Greek)			4
The town of Anchialo			
Bulgarian			946
Other (Greek)			286

Farms according to the ethnicity of the owners (area in decars)

<i>Anchialo county</i>	
Bulgarian	265 898
Other (Greek)	13
<i>The town of Anchialo</i>	
Bulgarian	27 232
Other (Greek)	7 592

Sources:

ЦДА, 453/2/2, л. 1 – Central Statistical Office, Population census as of 31st December 1920. Population according to provinces and counties. Anchialo county.

ЦДА, 453/2/1506, л. 1 – Central Statistical Office, Population census as of 31st December 1934. Known place of birth, ethnicity, language. Pomorie county.

ЦДА, 453/2/1872, л. 14 – Central Statistical Office, Population census as of 31st December 1934. Ethnicity, language, age, literacy. Pomorie county.

ЦДА, 453/3/1162, л. 59-60 – Central Statistical Office, Population census as of 31st December 1934. Farms according to their legal entity and the ethnicity of their owners. Pomorie county.

ГДС, *Резултати от преброяване на населението в България на 31 декември 1920. Окръг Бургас*, София, 1928.

ГДС, *Резултати от преброяване на населението в България на 31 декември 1934. Окръг Бургас*, София, 1938.

ГДС, *Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1926*, София, 1930.

ГДС, *Списък на населените места в Княжество България според преброяването на 31 декември 1934*, София, 1939.